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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTI ON TO THE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM 
Much more vital than the average North American 
realizes is the political and economic relationship exist-
ing between the United States and Latin America. Latin 
America buys more from the United States than does all of 
Europe put together--or than Asia, Africa and Oceania com-
bined.l In times of international crisis, such as during 
the two World Wars and throughout the Korean conflict, the 
nations of Latin America, with very few exceptions, sup-
ported the action of the United States of America. The 
Western Hemisphere is one of the few large areas of the 
world where a greater than average degree of solidarity has 
been achieved. Nevertheless, Pan-American relationships 
have frequently been marred by misunderstandings and diffi-
culties. In recent years these difficulties have not led 
to major wars, but have had the tendency to create suspi-
cion and lack of mutual confidence. 
One section of Latin America that has been especially 
afflicted by such misunderstandings is Central America. 
Geographic proximity has more closely linked the nations 
lRichard Nixon, "Meeting the People of Central 
America," g. §.. Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (April 11, 
1955)' 587. 
• 
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of this area to the United States than is true of their 
Latin American neighbors to the south. Economic and polit-
ical instability has often plagued the region, and upon 
many occasions the United States felt it necessary to 
intervene and even exert military force in order to termi -
nate Central American internal disorders . Such interven -
tions have aroused fears of imperialistic motives on the 
part of this country , and earned for the United States the 
unflattering appellation of the "Colossus of the North" 
which would seek to bestride two continents . 
Suspicions of imperialism are also strengthened by 
the fact that the largest commercial organization which 
operates in Central American is an American concern--the 
United Fruit Company . So great in wealth and size is the 
United Fruit _Company in that area that it too has been 
charged with imperialism- -an imperialism ~~~hich would se-
cure it a monopoly in the region and bend governments and 
people to its will . 
I • THE PR OB LEivf 
Statement of the problem . It was the purpose of 
this study (1) to g ive a brief analysis of American inter -
vention and its motives, methods, and achievement in 
Central America; (2) to describe the economic and cultural 
aspects of American influences as represented in the United 
Fruit Company, and its methods of operation in Central 
America; and (3) to present the local favorable and unfa-
vorable reactions to American foreign policy and economics 
as seen in Central America. 
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Importan~ £f the study ~ its relationsh!] to 
~resent~ ~oblems. For many years an anti-American 
sentiment has existed in Central America. This feeling is 
by no means universal, but it could very easily become much 
more widespread. The tide of na.tionalism has constantly 
been on the rise. Elements of Communistic leanings have 
fanned the fires of nationalism and have attempted to focus 
these forces into a campaign directed against the United 
States and American business organizations in Central 
America. 
A vivid example of this has been the government of 
Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala, who utilized the spirit of 
nationalism to develop an anti-American movement which 
secured a large following. Not until its overthrow did the 
general population learn that this government was Communist-
controlled. The purpose of this study has been to give a 
survey of American relations with Central America in order 
to see why and how these prejudice-producing problems have 
developed. 
The survey has included the significant political 
and diplomatic episodes that have a relationship to the 
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subject from the time of the proclamation of the Monroe 
Doctrine, in 1823, until the present time. The background, 
history and progress of the United Fruit Company has been 
traced from the year 1871 until the present. The reaction 
to the above developments have been evaluated and the study 
has been terminated with the author's conclusions and 
recommendations for the possible improvement of existing 
relations. 
II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED 
Central America. Central America is generally 
defined as the republics of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. In a strictly geographical 
sense, Panama must also be included, for she is now an 
independent member of the Isthmian community. Belize, or 
British Honduras, lies in the same geographical locality. 
However, Panama and Belize have not been included in this 
study. As a separate nation Panama is relatively new, 
and much of the common history of the five nations listed 
above does not directly concern her. Moreover, her rela-
tionship to the United States is in many ways quite unique. 
Belize was omitted from consideration because of its status 
as a British crown colony. 
The residents of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, 
Nicaragua , and Costa Rica consider themselves to be much 
more than near neighbors. These five states secured their 
independence from Spain as a single united nation, without 
having to fight a war that involved the loss of life and 
property. But when Francisco Morazan completed his term 
as the first president of the Central American Federation 
in 1838, the federation disintegrated and the five states 
went their separate, independent ways. 1 Even so, Honduras 
commemorates this common origin by having five stars on 
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her national flag--one star for each of the Central American 
nations of the original federation. 
Middle America. This study has employed the term 
Middle America in referring to the general Caribbean area 
in which the United Fruit Company has its operations. 
The United Fruit Company uses this term in referring to 
the territory of its sphere of influence. Middle America 
describes the section extending from Mexico to the northern 
coast of South America and including the island republics 
of the Caribbean. 
North Americans. The author has used frequently the 
term North Americans as distinguished from Latin Americans 
or Central Americans. The people of Latin America consider 
loavid R. Moore, The Bjstory of Latin America (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, 1941), P• 732. 
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themselves to be also "Americans, 11 which of course they are. 
Residents of the United States are customarily designated 
as norteamericanos by the Latin Americans. Obviously, this 
term also is not completely exact, for it would include 
Canadians, but it reduces repetitions and may add to 
clarity. Where it was felt that confusion was unlikely, 
the term Americans has been used to describe the residents 
of the United States, on the assumption that this usage is 
familiar to most readers. 
The United Eruit Compan~. Many persons are of the 
opinion that the United Fruit Company is a united organi-
zation of many independent companies that deal in various 
types of tropical fruits. This is a false impression. 
The United Fruit Company is a single large corporation 
that has its headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts. It 
has subsidiaries in the form of railroads, steamship, lines, 
and other types of communications, but it is to be con-
sidered as only one organization. The only tropical fruit 
that is handled by the United Fruit Company is the banana. 
This organization has been designated in this study by its 
full name as given above and also (to lessen redundancy) 
as United Fruit, Yn1ted, and the Companz. All of these 
terms are common in Central America and mean one and the 
same thing. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
In his recent years as a resident in Central America, 
the author was able to observe many of the actual situations 
and conditions described in this study. While this project 
was under way, a trip was made to Honduras and interviews 
were obtained with fifteen residents of that country con-
cerning the problems of the study. Three other Central 
Americans were interviewed in the United States. Those 
questioned were a senator, a clergyman, a shoemaker, a 
university student, a farmer, and others representing a 
variety of occupations and different levels in society. 
The results of these interviews are included in this study 
as a part of the primary sources that were utilized. The 
personal opinion of the author, which has resulted from a 
direct contact with the Central Americans, has been the 
partial basis for some of the conclusions and recommenda-
tions that have been formed. 
The United Fruit Company provided an abundance of 
informative material that proved of great assistance in 
the writer's attempt to give an objective appraisal of 
the role of that company in Central America. 
Secondary sources were heavily relied upon in the 
preparation of the section involving political and diplo-
matic history, and to a lesser extent in the section on 
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the United Fruit Company. Many quotations from periodical 
literature, including citations from Central American news-
papers, were used in the latter portion of the thesis. An 
attempt was made to secure several back issues of Central 
American newspapers that were published during days of 
political crisis and criticism. However, due to a changed 
political policy, the editors of these newspapers are not 
permitting their past criticisms to be circulated. The 
radical quotations cited were obtained by the author as he 
was permitted to spend a few minutes among the newspapers 
of the Honduran Government files. 
CHAPTER II 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL 
RELATIONSHIP BET~·JEEN THE maTED ST{!.TES 
AND CENTRAL A~illRICA 
There is a historical basis for the suspicion and 
even fe8r with which ~any Latin Americans regard the 
United States . In their thinking the Monroe Doctrine 
was designed not so much to keep Eur opeans out , but to 
give Nor th American s a fr e e hand in it/e s t ern Hemisphere 
exploitatioh . They point to the United States ' expansion 
into the Latin area as a ground for their fear . 
At no point did continental United States border 
on the Gulf of Hexico in 1800. In 1803 , the United States 
acquired the area of the Louisiana Purchase. Then the 
Floridas were added . Texas was annexed and by mid - century 
the United States ' territory included all the lest from the 
present Hexican border to Oregon--and the expansion was 
mad e into areas that had once been the properties of Spanish 
speaking nationsel 
York: 
I. E RLY DIPL011ATIC RELATIONS 1 fiTH CENTRAL Al1ERICA 
lnavid Ro Moore , The Histor~ of Latin America 
Prentice-Hall, 194IJ, p . 73 • 
(New 
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History seems to indicate that the United States had 
very little interest in Central America previous to the 
California gold rus:h in 1848. In 1822, when it appeared 
that portions of Central America were to be annexed by 
Iturbide's Mexican Empire, the congress of the little 
province of Salvador voted to incorporate with the United 
States. Salvador l ooked to the United States "as the head 
of the great republican family.u The authorities in Wash-
ington gave no attention to the pleas. Obviously, American 
interest in Central America was virtually non-existent.l 
Previous to the fall of the Spanish Empire in Central 
America, England's territory was confined to Belize on the 
eastern shore of the Yucatan Peninsula. However, when the 
Central American nations secured their independence, England 
assumed control of an area that almost doubled her Central 
American territory. 
By treaties with Spain, England had agreed to con-
fine her Central American colonization to an area between 
the Sibien and Hondo Rivers. Yet . by 1836 British settlers 
were to be found as far south as the Sarstoon River. In 
1840, the law of England was declared to reign in "the 
colony or settlement of British Honduras." The Monroe 
lMary Wilhelmine Williams, The People ~ Politics 
of Latin America (New York: Ginn and Company, 1938), p. 317. 
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Doctrine of 1823 clearly stated that the New t·Jorld 111as no 
longer open for European colonization, so the new republic 
of Guatemala appealed to the United States for assistance, 
but none was forthcoming. The Central American Federation 
vigorously protested , but the objections were ignored by 
England . Here existed a clear case of European coloniza-
tion in the Ne\lr ·rorld, yet the United States as well as 
England acted as if the Monroe Doctrine did not exist. In 
1838, England again expanded her Central American territory 
and took control of the Honduran island of Ruatan. Despite 
its advocacy of the donroe Doctrine, the United Stated did 
not complainol 
A study of these violations of the principles of the 
Honroe Doctrine emphasizes the comparative indifference of 
the United States to Central Ameri ca . 
There was no application of the principles of 
President r.ronroe to the states of Central America 
until the new territorial title on the Pacific Coast 
made so imperative the stra tegical significance of 
the Isthmuso2 
As the vlar between the United States and Hexico was 
coming to a close , Great Britain knew that the United States 
lsamuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the 
United States (New York: Harcourt , Brace and Company--, 1943), 
pp . 102-103. 
2rbid. , p. 99. 
I 
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would soon have much more territory on the Pacific coast 
and that a canal across the Central American Isthmus would 
be highly desirable. If the United States were permitted to 
construct a Central American canal, then the American posi-
tion would become even stronger in the New 1,\forld . At that 
time the Nicaraguan area seemed to be the most desirable 
location for a transcontinental canal. It was believed 
that due to the strategic location of Nicaraguan lakes and 
rivers much less excavation would be required than further 
to the south in Panama . Consequently, on January 1, 1848, 
England took possession of the Mosquito Coast. This area 
included a portion of Honduras and all of the eastern coast 
of Nicaragua . 
Nicaragua immediately protested and asked the United 
States for assistance. She even asked admission into the 
American Union for herself as well as for Salvador and 
Honduras . Once again the United St ates shovred no desire 
to obtain Central American territory, but she did come to 
Nicaragua's aid. 
The Mosqui to Goa st extended over the entire terri tory 
of Nicaragua that faced upon the Atlantic Ocean, and the 
United States was determined that England was not going to 
monopolize a canal route across Nicaragua by her claims to 
the disputed region. In the United States popular opinion 
demanded tha t England relinquish her claims, but England 
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was just as determined to hold 11her 11 territory. For a time 
war seemed likely between these two English speaking powers .l 
A settlement was made in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
and thus the United States and England were able to avert a 
war. Among other provisions, the treaty stated that both 
nations would never obtain or maintain exclusive control 
over the proposed Nicaraguan canal, and that neither nation 
would erect fortifications, control the canal exclusively, 
nor occupy, colonize, or exercise dominion over any part of 
Central America.2 
Clayton, the American Secretary of State at the 
time, had hoped to force the British from the Mosquito 
Coast with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Not only did England 
remain, but she declared these bits of territory a crown 
colony in 1852. It appeared that she was there to stay . 
The United States denounced this policy as "colony 
snatching," and an infraction of the Clayton-Bulvrer Treaty. 
It \vas also declared by the United States to be a violation 
of the Monroe Doctrine. British public opinion favored a 
settlement if one could be made honorably. Nothing was done 
luilliams, .QE• cit., p. 426. 
2Treaties Concluded~ the United States of America 
illQ Foreign Nations and Ind~an Tribes (United States 
Statutes at Large (Boston: Llttle,Brown and Company, 
185o), VoL I X, pp . 17lt--77. 
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until 1859. In that year, Britain signed a pact with 
Honduras in which she recognized the sovereignty of Honduras 
in the Bay Islands. A few months later, by a treaty with 
Nicaragua, England gave up all her claims to the Mosquito 
area. President Buchanan proclaimed this settlement a great 
diplomatic victory for the United States.l 
These treaties perhaps may represent the first diplo-
matic victory, and that a modest one, that the United States 
attained under the principles which were declared in the 
Monroe Doctrine.2 
One might logically suppose that the prestige of the 
United States was increased in Central America as a result 
of her aid to Nicaragua. A feeling of gratitude was not to 
be found, however, as Guatemala and Costa Rica for some 
time had been pro-British. An unfriendly government had 
gained control in Salvador in 1853, and about the same time 
the Nicaraguan government became anti-American. As long as 
England controlled the Bay Islands, Honduras alone among 
the Central American nations favored the North American 
position in the controversy with Britain. No doubt she was 
lThomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic Histo~~ Q! the 
Americsn ~~ (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc., 
1950), pp. 295-302. 
2nexter Perkins, Han~ Off (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1941), pp. 101-102. 
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pro-American because she retained her hope that the United 
States would help her secure control of the Bay Islands 
once again. She did not hope in vain.l 
One of the major factors for this anti-American 
attitude in Central America was the fact that the United 
States was still looked upon with suspicion as a result 
of the Mexican War. A bullying policy toward Mexico was 
still very evident and the United States was considered the 
"Colossus of the North.u 
One must remember that a generation prior to the 
above decade, the United States appeared somewhat indifferent 
to Central America. In the intervening period, Texas was 
annexed from Mexico and the United States had extended her 
frontier to the Pacific Ocean. Had not Central America 
become a place of strategic importance because of the dis-
covery of gold in California? Were not a considerable 
volume of trade, and hundreds of North Americans, now 
crossing the Isthmus on their way to the Pacific Coast? 
Could not the Central Americans have been thinking that 
their area was perhaps next in line for annexation? During 
this very same decade, other events added to Central 
American suspicion of the United States. 
libid., p. 104. 
II. THE SPIRIT OF MANIFEST DESTINY IN CENTRAL A:MERICA 
Within only three years, Texas, Oregon, and the 
Mexican cession became a part of the United States, and a 
million square miles were added to its territory. North 
American land hunger should have been satiated, but such 
was not the case. The New York Herald boldly declared, 
National glory--national greatness--the spread of 
political liberty on the continent, must be the 
thought and action by day, and throbbing dream by 
night, of the ~hole American people or they will sink 
into oblivion • .L 
A later writer noted, 
These were the days when Manifest Destiny was a 
dynamic force, when it was widely believed that 
America's multiplying millions were manifestly 
destined to spread their republican institution, 
though not necessarily by force, over at least the 
whole continent. These were the days when t he men 
talked of the 'universal Yankee nation' and 'an 
ocean-bound republic'; when the eagle was made to 
scream and the buffalo to bellow.2 
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In Nicaragua in 1854, a civil war broke out between 
the Conservatives and the Liberals. The Conservatives 
seemed about to win, for they had active support from 
Guatemala. It was not at all unusual for a political party 
to receive assistance from another Central American nation, 
during times of internal strife, but it was strange indeed 
when the Liberals sought aid from a private citizen of the 
lBailey, 2R• cit., p. 281. 2 Ibid., p. 234. 
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United States. The Liberals appealed to William Walker, 
who had filibustered in Mexico, and he quickly responded to 
their call. Within a few months, with the assistance of 
his group of American companions, he was the nation's Chief 
of State. It became apparent that Walker was there to 
further personal interests rather than those of Nicaragua. 
Perhaps his original idea was to secure control of Nicaragua 
so that it could be annexed to the American Union for the 
purpose of strengthening the hold of slavery. The Demo-
crats, who were strong in the South, in their political 
platform of 1856 put themselves on record as approving 
Walker's efforts to nregenerate" Nicaragua. 1 
It is significant that the United States made very 
feeble efforts to halt the outfitting of Walker's men in 
its own ports, despite the American anti-filibustering laws. 
President Pierce even accepted Walker's minister to Washing-
ton as being a legal representative of a ~ facto govern-
ment.2 The President and the Department of State were not 
unfriendly as long as Walker had prospect for success.3 
lrbiq., p. 294. 
2Graham H. Stewart, Lati~ America and the Uni!eq 
States (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1943 , 
p. 327., 
3nana G. Munro, The F~ve Republics of Central America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 83. 
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When Walker returned to the United States after having 
been driven from Nicaragua in 1857, he was greeted as a hero 
in New Orleans. That he had invaded a foreign country with 
American men and taken over the government at the cost of 
much life and property . seemed to matter little to him or to 
his admirers.l 
Walker made three attempts to establish himself as a 
I political leader in Central America. Each attempt ended in 
defeat. His first defeat was suffered at the hands of an 
army made up of representatives from all over Central 
America whose land had been invaded nby the pirates who 
sailed from the coasts of the United States.n Walker , after 
being beaten in battle, was permitted to surrender to the 
I 
captain of an American warship. The ship returned him to 
the United States. This time he was severely censured for 
violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua. President Buchanan 
was clear in stating that he felt that a crime had been 
committed. Walker nevertheless developed plans for another 
expedition to Nicaragua. On November 10, 1857, Walker was 
officially charged with violating the neutrality act of the 
United States. He was given his liberty only after having 
to post a bond. The very same night he sailed for Central 
lAnne Merriman Peck, The Pageant Qf Midd~~ American 
History (New York: Longman's Green, and Company, 1947), 
p. 319. 
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America with three hundred men, and within a few days he 
invaded Nicaragua at Greytown. Before he could consolidate 
his position, he was taken into custody by the United States 
naval force that had observed his landing . Once again he 
was returned to the United States . l 
Walker again was found in Central America in 1860. 
This time he was supposedly trying to assist some residents 
of one of the Honduran Bay Islands who did not want to be-
come subjects of Honduras . He was captured near Trujillo, 
Honduras, by British naval officers . They turned him over 
to the Honduran authorities and he was promptly executed 
September 12, 18~ 0 , by a Honduran firing squad.2 
It is significant that Walker's government was over-
thrown in 1856 by five armies . Each of tbe five Central 
American nations had an army in Nicaragua. It was very 
evident that Central Americans wanted the Yankee imperialist 
driven out . 
It was not at all difficult for the Central Americans 
to feel that Walker's activities were unsuccessful attempts 
at Yankee expansion under the theory of Manifest Destiny. 
Walker and his men left behind, not only a multitude of 
light-skinned children, but a mounting distaste for the 
lLawrence Greene, Th~ Filibuster (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-! errill Company, 1937), pp. 229-327 • 
2Ibid. 
United States. 
The filibustering expedition of William Walker 
his seizure of the government of Nicaragua the ' 
tolerance and finally the recognition acco;ded him 
by President Pierce and his advisers, all seemed to 
show that unscrupulousness and covetousness had more 
to do with American foreign policy than anything 
else.l 
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Even though some elements in the United States 
championed Walker's efforts in Central America, it must be 
remembered that the United States Government did frown upon 
his later activities and used both legal and military 
measures in attempts to deter him. Nevertheless, Central 
American apprehension of the United States was increasing 
at this time. 
There was an American controlled transportation 
system across Nicaragua, and a canal might be built 
by Americans across Panama. The British who opposed 
slavery were being driven out of Central America, 
and this was due more to American than to Central 
American influence. As long as slaveholders were 
dominant in the United States, the Latin Americans 
could not feel free from worry, for they knew that 
the slaveholders of the Southern States were anxious 
for more soil over which to extend slavery. In 1862 
Costa Rica expressed fears of this kind in a letter 
to Columbia stating that no nation could be •more 
useful and favorable' than the United States if only 
the said United States would solemnly agree to 
respect the independence and integrity of Latin 
American states, would not annex their land, and 
would not permit filibustering expeditions to be sent 
against them.2 
lPerkins, ~· £it., p. 104. 
2Moore, ~· cit., p. 737. 
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Even thou~h Walker's expeditions were not sponsored 
by the United States Government, Latin Americans could not 
readily forget that he was the citizen of a nation which 
had grown tremendously through expansion during the preceding 
fifteen years. 
III. AN INC REASING YANKEE INTEREST IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Throughout the last four or five decades of the 
nineteenth century the United States strove to improve her 
relations with the Central American republics. Under 
President Lincoln, Secretary of State Seward was determined 
to follow a policy of friendly relations and to gain, if 
possible, Central American good will. 
In Seward's instructions to his minister to Nicaragua, 
he declared, "Let unpleasant memories of the past be buried 
and let Nicaragua be encouraged to rely on the sympathy and 
support of the United States if she shall at any time come 
to need them. rt In 1867, Nicaragua had occasion to remember 
the promise of the United States, for she asked the American 
Government to secure a satisfactory solution for Nicaragua 
in regard to her 1860 treaty with England and the Mosquito 
territory . The United States re presentative to London 
received the assurance that England in no way desired to 
embarrass Nicaragua, and was further informed that the 
Nicaraguan minister had been given satisfactory evidence 
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of the justice of the British position.l 
Two other Secretaries of State, namely Secretary 
Blaine and Secretary Fish, attempted to assist Central 
America in a different way. Under the leadership of these 
men the United States laid great stress upon her desire 
that political unification be achieved among the Central 
American republics. The United States realized that 
political unification of the Central American states would 
result in stronger and more stable government. With a 
strong centralized government, the area would not be as 
vulnerable to European influence, and with more stable 
conditions in Central America, the United States could 
develop more profitable trade relations which would benefit 
American business. 
Central America after its liberation from Spain had 
existed for a short time as a political federation, but the 
union quickly disintegrated after the death of its first 
president, Francisco Morazan. In 1842, 1849, and in 1852, 
other similar attempts at unification were made, but no 
lasting results were obtained.2 Spanish individualism is 
perhaps the major factor that has prevented a permanent 
federation. 
lstewart, ~· Q11., pp. 330, 331. 
2Munro, ~· cit., pp. 164-184. 
Secretary Fish encouraged unification in 1872 and 
again in 1874, but any pacts signed were quickly broken. 
Secretary Blaine in writing to the American minister in 
Guatemala said in 1881, 
There is nothing this government more earnestly 
desires than the prosperity of these states, and 
out experience has taught us that nothing will so 
surely develop and guarantee such prosperity as 
their association with one common government . i 
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Further attempts for political union were made by 
the Central American states in 1885, 1887, and the final 
one for that century in 1895. Despite the open encourage-
ment from the United States throughout these negotiations, 
the century closed with the five republics as far apart as 
ever from the proposed consolidation. 
Not only was the United States interested in unifi-
cation and stability in Central America for political and 
economic reasons, but the cooperation of these little 
nations was necessary if the United States was to develop 
a transportation system across the isthmus. As early as 
1864 the United States signed a treaty with Honduras in 
which the former nation was given the right to construct an 
inter-ocean railroad through the country. The privilege 
conferred by this agreement has never yet been utilized. 
In return for a guarantee of the neutrality of Nicaragua, 
lstewart, ~· cit., p. 332. 
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the United States in 1867 obtained the free use of the 
Isthmus of Nicaragua for the passage of troops. In 1884, 
the United States and Nicaragua negotiated a treaty whereby 
the United States could build a canal across the isthmus 
that would be entirely under American control. This treaty, 
however, was never ratified by the American government.l 
During this latter half of the nineteenth century 
Secretary Blaine, perhaps more than any other American, 
attempted to improve United States' relations with Latin 
America . His interest was paternalistic as well as economic. 
Blaine had a deep interest in Latin America. His 
ideal was to persuade the neighboring republics to 
accept a kind of 'elder sister' relationship. Funda-
mentally, however, his policy seems to have been 
influenced by economic rather than altruistic motives. 
As a 'big business' Republican, Blaine was grieved to 
note that his country's adverse balance of trade with 
Latin America amountea to something over $100,000,000. 
This high disparity was largely due to the fact that 
the southern republics, though sending enormous 
quantities of raw materials to the United States, 
bought the great bulk of their manufactured goods from 
Europe. Blaine's idea was to dislodge competitors of 
the United States by forming closer commercial ties 
with Latin America. And since profitable ecomomic 
relationships could not exist amid the clash of arms, 
the United States would use its good office to termi-
nate wars in Latin America.2 
As a result of Blaine's ideas, be tried to become the 
arbiter of Latin American disputes. In this respect his 
lA. Curtis Wilgus, The Dey~opm)n! of Hisrani__g, America 
(New York: Rinehart and Company, 1941 , p. 713. 
2Bailey, _g:g. cit., p. 435 •. 
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services were not always appreciated or accepted . In 1882 , 
Mexico and Guatemala got into a boundary dispute . Guatemala 
appealed to the United States as the "natural protector of 
the Central American territory , n and consequently Blaine 
offered to arbi t rate . l In so doing , he expressed sympathy 
for Guatemala as the underdog " ·fexico a t firs t politely 
refused Blaine ' s arbitration and then indignantly rejec ted 
the proposal . He v1as unable to help Qua temala and obtained 
the ill-will of Mexico . 2 
Costa Rica and Columbia arranged in 1881 to present 
a boundary quarrel before European arbitrators, but when 
Blaine learned of it , he was openly quite irritated because 
the United States had not been consulted in this dispute " 
The basis for Blaine ' s displeasure was in the fact that the 
United States, in 1846 , by means of a treaty with Columbia 
(then called New Granada), had agreed to guarantee the 
sovereignty of Columbia over the province of Panama . 3 The 
border be tween Panama and costa Rica was the problem that 
was presented for arbitration . Blaine ' s ideas are here 
expressed in part and the reaction indicated that ·w-as cre-
ated in the two nations involved: 
Dodd, 
l ~Tilgus, .2..12 · cit . , p . 713 . 
2Bailey, .£12· cit . , p . 435 . 
3David Saville Muzzeyt J ame s Q. Blaine 
Mead and Company, l934J, pp . 197-98 . 
(New York: 
Our opinion should have been consul ted, he con-
tended, both as to the nature of the arbitration 
and the choice of the arbiters; and he warned both 
the countries that the United States would not 
' hold itself bound, where its right, obligations 
or interests ~ay be concerned , by the decision of 
any arbitrator in whose appointment it has not 
been consulted and in whose selection it has not 
concurred o 1 
costa Rica resented Blaine ' s action as an 
' insult, ' declaring that she had not only not been 
a party to the Treaty of 1846 but had no t even been 
notified of it , and contending t ha t t he United 
States , on accoun t of its obvious i nteres t in the 
region under dispute , would not be a proper or 
impartial arbitrator . Columbia, too , though less 
vehement in protest, v1as no better satisfied i.vith 
Blaine ' s course. Fearing that the protection 
offered by the United States was turning into 
tutelage and dictation, she had herself proposed 
admitting European po~ers to a share in the guar-
antee of the isthmus. 
Blaine was very anxious to call a conference that 
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would include all of the ' merican republics. The Latin 
nations of America had had conferences, but not all 
nations had been represented. Plans for a complete Pan 
American conference had been ~ade as early as lg8o, but 
the meeting had not been held. On October 2, 1889, at the 
invitation of Secretary Blaine, eighteen of the twenty- one 
American republics met in ·~shington, and the sessions 
continued until April 19, 1890. 
The leading 1merican motives behind this call, as 
the program later demonstrated, 1vere the increase of 
com~erce, the profitable placing of capital, and the 
lrbid., pp. 209-1o. 
maintenance of peace, without which investments 
would be neither safe nor remunerative. Latin 
Americans, on their side, were more interested 
in their own security and political independence 
than in any purely economic gains.l 
As a result of this conference, the Pan American 
Union was established, and this first gathering served as 
the entering wedge for succeeding conferences. Two major 
decisions were made: (l) that arbitration be established 
as the method for settling international disputes, and 
(2) that there be created an International Union of the 
27 
American Republics for the preparation and distribution of 
commercial information. Needless to say, these two prin-
ciples were favored and fostered by Blaine.2 
Any good will that the United States received as a 
result of her benevolent gestures during the Pan American 
Conference suffered a set back when American troops were 
landed in Nicaragua in 1894. The Indians of the Mosquito 
Coast were becoming very restless, and when Nicaragua pro-
claimed her absolute authority over them they appealed to 
England, who had been their former protector. Nicaragua 
invaded the area. England, declaring that she was not 
violating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, landed troops at 
Bluefields. To restore order, and to protect American 
lMoore, ~· cit., pp. 737-738. 
2Ibid., pp. 738-739. 
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interests, United States Marines v1ere also landed at 
Bluefieldso An armed conflict was averted . England 
and Nicaragua signed a convention by which the Indians 
were placed under the exclusive control of Nicaragua . 
As soon as the treaty was signed all foreign troops were 
withdrawnol 
From the United States ' viewpoint , we had done 
Nicaragua a favor, but to Nicaragua it \vas an open insinua-
tion that she vias not capable of dealing \vi th the situation 
as an independent , sovereign nation and that therefore we 
considered the presence of American marines was not only 
advisable but necessary. For the first tine Yankee marines 
landed in Central America . It \vas a foreta ste of many 
similar events that 'YTere to deve l op in the next centuryo 
IV . T_TE ROOSSVELT COROLLARY iL'D T IE"BIG STICK" 
The war wi_th Spain made the United States dominant 
in the Caribbean area and gave her colonies in the Pacific 
as well . Possessions in both oceans made an Isthmian canal 
imperative . Hith a definite revival of Manifest Destiny 
among the North Americans, Central Americans could easily 
realize that the narrow mid-~merican isthmus was going to 
1Wilgus , QE• cit., Po 800o 
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be much more important in the eyes of their big neighbor to 
the north. 
In the United States many were eager to draw up plans 
for the immediate construction of a canal across Central 
America. In January, 1900, a bill was introduced in Congress 
that provided for the construction of a canal in Nicaragua. 
Of course this was done in direct defiance of the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, but many Senators were openly declaring 
"dishonor be damned. ttl 
England at the time was involved in the Boer War and 
desperately needed American friendship, so she was per-
suaded to make concessions. The document that was first 
drawn up by Secretary John Hay and Lord Pauncefote, 
England's ambassador in Washington (January 5, 1900), pro-
vided that the United States could construct a Central 
American canal, but it must not be fortified under any 
circumstances. 
The non-fortification clause of the first Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty became so unpopular that Secretary Hay 
had to seek a completely new agreement. The second Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty (November 18, 1901), was a complete 
cancellation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The United 
States was given permission to construct, maintain, and 
lBailey, Q]. cit., p. 533. 
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fortify the proposed canal . l 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to give a de-
tailed account of the negotiations that brought about the con-
struction of the canal in Panama , but c::ne must remember that a 
tremendous amount of consideration was given to the proposed 
Nicaraguan route . Nicaragua, at firs t, was cons idered t o be 
the best location for the canal . By using a Nicaraguan canal, 
a boat would travel a shorter distance between the two coasts 
of the United States than it would by going through Panama . 
From a diplomatic standpoint, Nicaragua was an inde -
pendent nation and the United States could deal with her on 
a direct basis, whereas Panama was under the control of 
Columbia, and the latter was not sympathetic to a North Amer-
ican canal in her territory . Congress was so convinced that 
the Nicaraguan site was the preferred location that the 
Spooner Act was passed in June, 1902 . This act suggested 
that the canal be constructed in Nicaragua unless the French 
New Panama Company could be induced to sell the work it had 
done on a Panama Canal at a price that would undercut the 
Nicaragua cost . Had it not been for the powerful lobbying 
that was conducted by representatives of the French New 
Panama Company , and the eventual reduction of their price 
from $109,141,400 to $4o ,ooo,ooo , the canal might have been 
constructed in Nicaragua . Also one must remember the 
libid . ' pp . 533' 534 . 
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influence exerted by President Roosevelt,who at first wanted 
a Nica raguan canal but later switched to favor a Panamanian 
canal.l 
Even though the canal was not located in the section 
of Central America that is discussed in this thesis, these 
events had a number of direct major influences. Jhen 
England signed the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which super-
seded the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, England was giving to the 
United States a free hand in Central America . The United 
States ' footaola in the Caribbean became ever more secure. 
In Central America the local anti-American sentiment had 
reason for increased alarm . 
To the Central Americans it was an open and evident 
fact that the acquisition of the Panama Canal si t e was the 
result of American intrigue. They felt that the Panamanian 
Revolution was Yankee-inspired and supported. This was 
evident by Theodore Roosevelt ' s blunt but revealing state-
ment, "I took the Canal Zone and let congress debate and 
while the debate eoes on the canal does also ."2 The ques-
tionable methods used by the United States and its long time 
refusal to make an apology or even offer an indemnity to 
Columbia, increased the char ges of imperialism leveled at 
the North American nation. 
lBemis, 2£· cit., pp . 148-49. 
2New York Times, H~arch 24 , 1911, as cited by Henry F. 
Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt ( New York: Harcourt , Brace and 
Com an 19 1) • 330. 
The highhanded, aggressive spirit of the Presi-
dent and government in the whole affair laid the 
foundation for years of fear and resentment in 
Latin America. All her sister nations sympathized 
with injured Columbia.l 
Columbians persistently refused to accept 
Roosevelt's view of the case, and for nearly twenty 
years sued for an apology and an indemnity. What 
was worse, much anxiety and ill-feeling was gener-
ated elsewhere in Latin America against the high-
handed action of this all-powerful northern 
neighbor.2 
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With the aquisition of the Canal Zone, Central America 
was bound to be more within the realm of North American 
influence. The Canal Zone was to be fortified and occupied 
with American troops, and the proximity of these forces was 
to add more weight to the opinion of Uncle Sam in the 
Caribbean area. 
Theodore Roosevelt confused the Latin American policy 
of the United States even more by his theory that came to be 
called the "Roosevelt Corollaryn to the Monroe Doctrine. 
This "big stickn policy was proclaimed in his annual message 
of 1904 as follows: 
Any country whose people conduct themselves well 
can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation 
shows that it knows how to act with reasonable 
efficiency and decency in social and political mat-
ters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, 
it need not fear interference from the United States. 
Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results 
lAnn Merriman Peck,~· £1!., p. 344. 
2Moore, QQ. cit., p. 457. 
.. 
in general loosening of the ties of civilized 
society, may in America as elsewhere, ultimately 
require intervention by some civilized nation, 
and in the western hemi sphere the adherence of 
the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force 
the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant 
cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the 
exercise of an international police power.l 
33 
President Roosevelt was in many respects justified 
in his statement. In the light of historical evidence, the 
"Roosevelt Corollary" did preserve the peace in Latin 
America and it prevented European armed intervention. How-
ever, Roosevelt's statement had a resounding effect in Latin 
Ame rica. In The Pageant of Middle American HistoiX, Ann 
Peck gives us an incisive picture of the reaction at that 
t i me: 
The Colossus of the North was astride Latin 
America and Theodore Roosevelt was the manifesta-
tion of its s pirit. Roosevelt of the Big Stick 
was the man who initiated the t heory that it was 
the moral res ponsibility and duty of the United 
States to keep the Latin American countries in 
order, particularly Mexico and Central America, the 
nearest neighbors. This new interpretation of the 
Monroe Doctrine made t he document hated in Latin 
America. What price safety from European powers if 
they were to be dominated and perhaps absorbed by 
the Colossus of the North? Ruben Dorio, famous 
Latin American poet, expressed their feeling when 2 he chanted, 'Roosevelt, thou foe of Free America~' 
--·----
lJames D. Richardson, A Compilation of 1hg Messages 
and Papers Q! the Presidents (Washington: Bureau of 
National Literature and Art, 1908), X, p. 831. 
2Peck, ~· £1!., p. 344. 
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During the next twenty-five years, the United States 
frequently used the "big stick" and the Roosevelt Corollary 
as a basis for intervention in Central America as well as 
in other sectors of Latin America . 
However, Roosevelt did not apply the "big stick11 
immediately in Central America . Secretary of State Elihu 
Root persuaded the President to use American influence to 
reunite the troubled Central American countries. As a 
result of Root's suggestion, President Roosevelt and 
President Porfirio Diaz of Mexico, in 1906, offered their 
good offices in a war that existed between Guatemala, 
Salvador, and Honduras. The resulting arbitration took 
place on board t he United States' cruiser Marble~ and 
peace was signed.l 
To further the interests of peace, another conference 
was called in September, 1906 at San Jose, Costa Rica . All 
the Central American nations were represented at this meet-
ing except Nicaragua . Nicaragua would not recognize the 
right of the United States to interfere in Central American 
affairs . The conference decided that future disputes 
would be settled by arbitration in the Central American 
Court of Justice that was to be set up.2 
lBemis, QQ• £1!., p . 160. 
2Wilgus, QQ• cit., p. 714. 
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During the remainder of 1906 and throughout most of 
1907 disorders continued with Honduras and Nicaragua as the 
chief offenders. More than once the United States, backed 
by Mexico, was called upon to bring about arbitration to 
avert hostilities, but few agreements were ever carried 
out. By the middle of 1907, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
and Salvador were all preparing for a general war. As a 
result of the direct intervention of President Roosevelt 
and President Diaz, the states of Central America agreed 
to meet at a general peace conference in Washington.l 
The delegates from the five nations met in Washington 
on November 14, 1907. Following the lead of Salvador, each 
nation declared that it had no claims or grievance against 
its neighbors and was willing to establish a closer union. 
The meeting almost broke up when Nicaragua proposed a 
complete Central American Federation. It seemed evident 
that the Central American leaders were wanting more 
peaceful relations between their countries, but did not 
favor a closely knit federation, for this would infringe 
upon their feeling of local independence. However, harmony 
soon was restored and by December 20, eight conventions 
were signed and it was believed that many of the causes for 
war and revolution had been removed. The two major 
lrbid., p. 714. 
p 
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agreements were that a Central American Court of Justice 
was to be established for the compulsory arbitration of 
international desputes, and Honduras was neutralized so 
that the neighbors to the north and south of her could not 
make war against each other.l 
The Central American Court of Justice proved a weakJ 
ineffective organization. This was true largely to the 
fact that the member states refused to abide by its deci-
sions when their interests were affected, and the Court 
lacked power to enforce its decisions. The United States, 
which had helped to bring it into existence, by direct 
interference brought about the eventual downfall of the 
Court. 
Shortly after the establishment of the Central 
American Court of Justice, Jose Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua 
upset the applecart. He had been an international trouble-
maker, and had the desire to unite Central America under 
his control. His general attitude is admirably summed up 
in a statement attributed to him, ur ridicule the United 
States, laugh at Germany, spit on England. 112 He was ruling 
Nicaragua with an iron hand when a revolution broke out 
against him in 1909. In the fighting that followed two 
lMunro., 210. 
2Bailey, ~· cit., p. 583. 
Americans that were serving with the insurgents were 
captured and immediately executed. 
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Secretary Knox recalled the American representative 
and denounced Zelaya as a "blot on the history" of 
Nicaragua.! The same occasion was used by President Taft 
to dismiss Zelaya's representative in Washington, and to 
also land marines at Bluefields to protect foreign nation-
als and property. In defense of this action, Secretary 
Knox stated "that the revolution represented the ideals and 
will of a majority of the Nicaraguan people more truthfully 
than the government of President Zelaya .n2 
As a result of both internal and external pressure, 
Zelaya was forced to present his resignation to the 
Nicaraguan assembly and left the country. The assembly 
accepted the resignation, and seemed to be glad to be rid 
of him, but they protested formally against American inter-
vention in Nicaraguan affairs.3 
Zelaya's national assembly appointed Dr. Jose Madriz 
as its president. However, the United States would not 
grant recognition to a president that had been associated 
with the Zelaya government. The Conservatives continued 
!Williams, QQ. cit., PP• 438, 439. 
2Bemis, ~~·cit., p. 162. 
3williams, QQ. cit., p. 439. 
p 
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with the original uprising that had resulted in Zelaya's 
resignation. The forces of the Liberals, the former Zelaya 
government, were quite successful in their military engage-
ments until the presence of American marines and warships 
prevented them from achieving important military victories. 
Turmoil reigned as the Liberals under Madriz struggled to 
retain contro1. 1 
The Liberal government, not being permitted to fight 
as it desired, fell on August 20, 1910, and the Conserva-
tives under General Jose Estrada entered Managua. Liberal 
leaders as they left town shouted in the streets, uneath to 
the Yankees." During those days a heavy guard was placed 
at the American Legation. General Estrada announced that 
his brother Juan Estrada had been appointed as the Provi-
sional President and that free elections would soon be 
held. The new leader, even before he reached the capital 
cabled the Secretary of State assuring the American people 
of the "warm regard entertained for them by the victorious 
party of the revolution."2 This was just what Secretary 
Knox wanted. In keeping with the Roosevelt Corollary, 
once again the "big stick" had been used in Central America. 
!Harold Norman Denny Dollars for ~llets (New York: 
The Dial Press, 1929), pp. S4-90. 
21£1Q., pp. 90, 91. 
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V. DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 
Since the United States had declared itself the 
arbiter in the Caribbean area, England stated that the 
American Government should take the responsibility of see-
ing that these small nations pay their just debts to 
European powers. If these debts were not adequately cared 
for, stated England, then the peace of the region would be 
in danger. During the Administration of President Taft, 
and under the direction of Secretary of State Knox, the 
debts of some delinquent countries were arranged so that 
they could be paid off by loans from American bankers in 
order that the danger of European intervention would be 
removed. These loans were secured and paid off by the 
customs receipts of the debtor nations. Companies of 
American marines were stationed in these countries to main-
tain order and to back up the American administration of 
finances. The governments were thus controlled by American 
political and financial power that was supported by armed 
force. This as "Dollar Diplomacy. nl 
Secretary Knox stated in a speech before the New 
York State Bar Association: 
The logic of political geography and of strategy, 
and now our tremendous national interest created by 
lPeck, QD• Qit., p. 383. 
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the Panama Canal, make the safety , the peace, and 
the prosperity of Central America and the zone of 
the Caribbean of paramount interest to the Govern-
ment of the United States . Thus the malady of 
revolutions and financial collapse is most acute 
precisely in the region where it is most dangerous 
to us . It is here that we seek to apply a remedy . l 
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Faced with these dangers, Taft readily accepted the 
wider implications of the Roosevelt Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine . Taft felt that American capital used in 
this way not only helped protect the Canal Zone , but it 
brought financial and political stability to the countries 
involved . At the same time the bankers in the United States 
derived a profit . 
It will be remembered that according to the conven-
tions signed at the .fushington Conference of 1907, Honduras 
was to be in a state of perpetual neutrality. Because of 
heavy foreign indebtedness, Honduras could not develup a 
strong government, and therefore was subject to revolutions . 
Secretary Knox and the Honduras representative signed a 
convention in 1911 whereby the debts were to be refunded by 
American bankers, and secured by Honduras customs which were 
to be administrated by an American approved agent . However , 
the American-sponsored plan was not ratified by the United 
States Senate , and the Honduran Congress, principally on con-
stitutional grounds, overwhelmingly rejected the agreement . 2 
lBailey, Q.Q . cit., p . 582 . 
2stewart, QQ . cit., pp . 351, 352 . 
q 
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Later in 1911, the United States was called upon to 
arbitrate a revolution in Honduras. A provisional govern-
ment was established; Dr. Francisco Bertrand became the 
temporary president, and peace was restored. President Taft 
was given by Tionduras a vote of thanks "for his friendly 
mediation towards the reestablishment of peace in the 
Republic of Honduras."l 
Dollar Diplomacy was perhaps best known in Nicaragua. 
After the overthrow of the Zelaya government, a period of 
confusion followed, and eventually Adolfo Diaz emerged in 
1911 as the 11 consti tutionalt' president. He immediately 
received American recognition. The nation was drastically 
in debt to British syndicates in much the same fashion as 
Honduras. In order to avert difficulties with the European 
power, Secretary Knox negotiated a treaty with the new 
government (June 6, 1911) whereby the debt would be refunded 
by New York bankers. The Senate of the United States 
refused to ratify the agreement. However, the Department 
of State still wanted these debts taken out of British 
hands, so through the Department's influence, the New York 
bankers signed private contracts with Nicaragua to partially 
refund the debts.2 
1rbid., PP· 352,353. 
2Bemis, . 2Q• gi t., p. 163. 
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Shortly thereafter, a new revolution threatened the 
United States-backed regime of President Diaz. If this 
government fell, all the efforts of the State Department 
to bring about stability would have been lost. Diaz 
requested American aid, so about 2700 United States marines 
were landed in 1912. After a sharp engagement at Leon, the 
marines occu,pied most of the principal cities of the 
nation. From 1912 to 1933 (except for a brief interval) 
marines were to remain in Nicaragua to keep the government 
in office, police the elections, and train the constabulary.l 
When it was rumored that Germany was interested in a 
Nicaraguan canal, Knox tried to further the interests of 
the United States by signing an agreement with the 
Nicaraguan government whereby the United States would 
receive the exclusive right of way for a canal and leases 
on a few small islands in the Caribbean. For this consider-
ation, Nicaragua was to receive $3,000,000. This proposi-
tion was presented too late to be ratified by the Taft 
administration, but the same plan was later to be presented 
under President Wilson.2 
During these political disturbances in Central 
America, a note was issued from Washington in September, 
---------------
lrbtg., p. 164. 
2Ibid. 
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1912, which declared that under the Washington treaties of 
1907, the United States felt that it had a "moral mandate" 
to try to preserve peace in Central America; it would 
therefore try to support established governments against 
revolution. It was further stated that force, if necessary, 
would be used to protect the American legations . This 
announcement increased the suspicion and resentment against 
the United States, especially on the part of the Liberals 
in Nicaragua.l 
VI. INTERVENTION DURING THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION 
When Woodrow Wilson came into office in 1913, he had 
a program of reform in foreign as well as domestic policy. 
The " big stick" and uDollar Diplomacy" were scuttled. In 
his Mobile Address of 1913, the Good Neighbor Policy, which 
his Assistant Secretary of the Navy was to develop twenty 
years later, was foreshadowed in a definite way. However, 
Wilson ended up by reviving Dollar Diplomacy, and by carry-
ing out more interventions in Latin America as a whole than 
Theodore Roosevelt and Taft combined.2 
Nicaragua once again was to be the major object of 
lWilliams, ~· cit., p . 440. 
2Arthur P. Whitaker, 'tThe United States in Latin 
America Since 186 5, rt Current Historx, XXVIII (1\'"arch, 1955), 
154-59. 
American intervention in Central America. It will be 
remembered that the Conservative Party in Nicaragua had 
secured control and recognition as a result of the inter-
vention of United States marines. President Diaz and the 
Conservatives had continued to be friendly to American 
interests--both political and financial. In the election 
of 1916, the Liberals, who were very much dissatisfied, 
chose as their candidate Doctor Irias, a close friend and 
follower of ex-president Zelaya. The Conservatives 
selected as their man, General Emiliano Chamorro, one who 
had ably served as Nicaraguan minister to Washington. 
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In Latin America ~ it seems to be axiomatic that the 
only way a party not in power can win an election is by a 
revolution, for the party in power controls the election 
and somehow almost always comes out with the greatest 
number of votes. The United States did not desire to see 
anyone connected with Zelaya return to power, so · it 
actively supported the Conservative candidate, General 
Chamorro. In addition to American moral support, one 
hundred American marines were stationed in the country to 
retain order. The party in power in such a situation had 
little difficulty in winning the election.l 
The American Secretary of State, William Jennings 
lstewart, Q£• cit., p. 361. 
• 
.. 
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Bryan, soon began negotiations with President Chamorro in 
regard to an acceptable canal treaty. Chamorro's prede-
cessor, Diaz, had used the canal route as bait to make a 
close alliance with the United States in order to benefit 
himself and the Conservatives. He had proposed that if the 
canal was built, the United States would have the right to 
intervene in case of disorder. This plan was not acceptable 
to the United States Senate. However, Bryan did work out a 
treaty, (approved in 1916), that came to be known as the 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.1 
This treaty gave to the United States an exclusive 
ninety-nine year option for the building of a Nicaraguan 
canal. The American government was also granted naval 
bases on islands in the Caribbean and in the Gulf of Fonseca. 
For the agreement, Nicaragua received three million dollars. 
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Salvador immediately pro-
tested in a vigorous way, for Nicaragua had negotiated 
this treaty without consulting them, and their territorial 
1 
rights were directly involved. The proposed canal route 
included the harbor at Greytown and the San Juan River. 
Costa Rica had rights on the harbor and her territory 
bordered on the San Juan River. Nicaragua, Salvador, and 
lThe Unitgg States Statutes ~ Larg~ (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1917), XXXIX, Part II, 1661-
1664. 
> 
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Honduras bordered on the Gulf of Fonseca and all had equal 
jurisdiction over its waters. However, Nicaragua had 
granted the use of this body of water to a foreign power 
without her neighbors' consent. 
Costa Rica and Salvador consequently brought suit 
against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice. 
The Court condemned Nicaragua for the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, 
because it had been negotiated without consulting the other 
countries whose territories were ~nvolved. The Court did 
not declare the treaty void for it stated that it had no 
authority over the United States, one of the originators 
of the treaty. The United States ignored the Court's 
decision and refused to influence Nicaragua in any way to 
bring about the treaty's cancellation. This was the last 
time that this Court tried to settle a dispute in Central 
America. 
The attitude of the United States in the treaty 
controversy lost for the nation the last of the 
prestige it had gained as a friendly big neighbor 
in the Washington Conference. The United States had 
sponsored the Court of Justice and now helped to 
destroy it. Woodrow Wilson, despite his good inten-
tions, did little better in Central America than Taft, 
the friend of American capital. 
Possession of the canal route has al~mys made 
Nicaraguans the prey of international ambitions and 
of adventurers. Sometimes, it is to be hoped, this 
new waterway between the oceans will bring to 
Nicaragua and all Ce£tral America the advantages they 
should have from it. 
lpeck, Q]. cit., p. 390. 
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William Jennings Bryan also was able to negotiate a 
treaty of friendship with Honduras during the time that he 
was the Secretary of State. This was one of his many agree-
ments that were called the "cooling-off treaties". The 
United States and Honduras under the provisions of the 
treaty agreed to refer disputes to an international committee 
for arbitration, and agreed not to resort to war while the 
negotiations for arbitration were in progress.l 
It was evident that Central Americans had not lost 
all confidence in their big neighbor. When the United 
States entered the World WarJ: all five countries except 
Salvador declared war on Germany, and even Salvador stated 
that all her ports were available for the United States' 
and Allied use. 
In the declarations of war the United States was 
usually expressly mentioned: 'Guatemala assumes the 
same belligerent attitude as the United States'; 
even El Salvador, in announcing its attitude, de-
clared that 'El Salvador as an American nation could 
not fail to recognize, in the conflict between the 
United States and Germany, the solidarity which binds 
it to the great Republic of the North ••• and that 
its condition of neutrality could not lead it to the 
point of considering the United States as a belliger-
ent subject to the ordinary rules of international 
law.' During the peace negotiations the Central 
American republics boldly accepted the idealistic 
principles of President alson and entered the League 
luniteg States Statutes ~ ~~, ~· cit., pp. 
1672-1674. 
.. 
of Nations, fearing not a jot lest they be thereby 
drawn into the broils of Europe.l 
VII. FURTHER INTERVENTION AND ITS LIQUIDATION 
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The Secretary of State of the Republican administra-
tion that took office in 1921 was determined that changes 
should be made in American foreign policy. 
It was the policy of Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes (1921-1925) to liquidate intervention, 
but in this administration, intervention took a new 
lease on life. This brought to a climax the Latin 
American resentment against 'Yankee Imperialism' 2 which had been mounting for the past twenty years. 
Secretary Hughes desired to do something to aid in 
the cause of peace, inasmuch as the United States had failed 
to become a part of the League of Nations . Among his inter-
ests was Central America, and the area truly needed someone's 
attention. The principles that had been established and 
agreed upon at the Washington Conference of 1907 had been 
abrogated by Nicaragua, and consequently the entire move-
ment for peace appeared to be breaking down once again in 
Central America. In 1922, a new conflict was about to begin 
between Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua . -lad it not been 
for the mediation of Secretary Hughes and the Government of 
lstewart, £l2• cit., p. 353. 
2Arthur P. Whitaker, .Q£. cit., p. 156. 
ps 
49 
the United States, prospects for peace would have collapsed. 1 
Secretary Hughes felt that if the principles of the 
Washington Conference of 1907 could be reestablished, then 
peace and political order would be more nearly possible and 
the United States marines could be withdrawn from Nicaragua. 
Consequently, in response to Hughes' invitation, the five 
Central American republics convened at the Washington Con-
ference of 1922-23. Under the chairmanship of Secretary 
Hughes, thirteen treaties were signed among the five nations. 
These treaties dealt with subjects such as the preservation 
of peace, disarmament, finances, labor, social welfare, and 
other i~portant matters of mutual interest. The outstand-
ing accomplishment was the revival of the Central American 
Tribunal which was to deal with the international disputes 
between states. In some respects this new organization was 
less rigorous than the plan of 1907, but the new plan was 
more realistic. The old plan gave to the court power to 
intervene in all disputes of whatever nature, whereas the 
new agreement established the principle that no nation was 
to enter into a civil war or the internal affairs of another 
country. 
Another important principle established was that 
revolutions were to be frowned upon, and any government 
lBemis, QQ. cit., p. 204. 
pz 
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that achieved its power by unconstitutional means was not 
to be recognized . This agreement, which was embodied in 
the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, became the basis for 
more United States intervention in Central America . 
Even before the Washington treaties could be ratified, 
a defeated presidential candidate in Honduras resorted to 
revolution. Secretary Hughes was determined that the new 
pacts would be enforced, and as a result, formal relations 
were broken off, warships entered Honduran waters, and 
marines were landed. Order soon was restored, but unlike 
Knox and Bryan, Hughes did not recommend that the nati on 
be occupied. Delegates from each Central American state, 
with the American representative Sumner Welles, met at 
Amapala, and set up and recognized a provisional government. 
This government was in power until a new president was 
chosen in a free election. 1 
Again in March 1924, the United States attempted to 
stabilize the government of Honduras by Placing a presi-
dential embargo upon the shipment of munitions from the 
United States to Honduras . Also through the diplomatic 
efforts of the United States, the $150,ooo,ooo debt that 
was owed to British bondholders was scaled down to $6,ooo, 
000, and refunded so that the remainder could be paid in 
51 
thirty annual payments . l 
The General Treaty of Peace and Amity was to prove 
quite successful, and was to remain effective until it was 
denounced by Salvador and Costa Rica in 1933 . At that time, 
Salvador had had a successful revolution under the leader-
ship of General Wmrtinez , and Costa Rica wa s desirous of 
recognizing the new regime . To do so, Costa Rica joined 
Salvador in renouncing the above treaty. Shortly thereafter, 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua also gave their recogni-
tion to the ~~rtinez government, and thus Central American 
recognition was complete . The United States soon granted 
her recognition, and in this way the General Treaty of 
Peace and Amity was abrogated, at least with respect to the 
policy that a government that achieves power by means of 
the revolution would not be recognized . 
When the new treaties of the second Washington Con-
ference became effective, the United States hoped that the 
American marines could be withdrawn from Nicaragua . This 
withdrawal was delayed until after the Nicaraguan national 
elections of 1925-.--- Once again the party in power controlled 
the election, and the opposition could do little to resist 
as the American marines supported martial law and all 
attempts at rebellion were surpressed. American public 
l Ibid • . 
... 
opinion, however, became so opposed to the Nicaraguan 
occupation that the marines were entirely withdrawn in 
August of 1925. 
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Almost immediately politicians began to scramble for 
power. Emiliano Chamorro promptly took over the government, 
and the President and the Vice-President were forced to flee 
the country. Chamorro was recognized by no foreign power 
and soon was ousted. Congress in the midst of the confusion 
selected as president Adolfo Diaz, a man who was definitely 
pro-American. 
Juan Sacasa, the Vice- President who had been disposed 
by Chamorro, stated that he had a legal claim to the 
presidency and, consequently, secured arms and support from 
his place of exile in Mexico. Soon he invaded the eastern 
coast of Nicaragua . Riot reigned in the country. Liberals 
and Conservatives fought with each other throughout the 
entire nation. Most of the people supported Sacasa, for he 
previously had become popular as a result of his opposition 
to the resented American armed intervention. President Diaz 
asked for American assistance, claiming that Mexico was 
behind the rebellion, and stating that he could no longer 
protect foreign property. 
Marines once again occupied Nicaragua and General 
Henry L. Stimson successfully mediated between the two 
warring parties . The participants in the revolution were 
p 
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forced to turn in their guns to President Diaz. For having 
requested the Americans to return, Diaz became a man despised 
by his countrymen and all of Latin America.l 
Both the Liberals and the Conservatives agreed to 
permit another election under American supervision. This 
election proved to be the first free election ever held in 
Nicaragua . Consequently the Liberals were returned to 
power with the election of General Moncada, a leader of the 
Sacasa revolutionaries. The American marines immediately 
started a program to train the Guardia Nacional, but in the 
midst of their activities, they were called upon to aid in 
the attempted capture of Sandino, a Nicaraguan outlaw who 
had a large following. The Americans tried many methods 
to find and defeat the well-known rebel. Even bombs were 
dropped on his mountain strongholds, but for many months 
Sandino could not be defeated nor captured by the marines 
who were supported by the Guardia Nacional. 
Sandino always prided himself in the fact that the 
Yankees could never overcome him. Other Nicaraguans shared 
his joy, for regardless of what they thought of Sandino as 
a man, they were happy that he was opposing the Yankees, 
because American guns and bombs were killing Nicaraguans. 
When the American soldiers were finally withdrawn, the 
lPeck, QR. cit., pp. 390-393. 
> 
11Sandinistas 11 boasted that the Yankee had been driven out 
by them . Sandino eventually was defeated and executed by 
the Guardia Nacional . l 
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On November 22, 1929, Secretary of State Stimson 
annom1ced that t he American marines would gradually be with-
drawn from Nicaragua . Bo t h the Conservatives and the Liberals 
were opposed to the plan , for they feared t he results . Before 
this project could be cut into operation, continued political 
instability made it necessary to increase the number of 
marines present . However, by June , 1931, the original 
number of twelve hundred was reduced to five hundred and 
t hese r emained as a legation guard . The Sandino insurrection 
described above brought pressure to bear upon Stimson to 
bring in a larger f orce . Secretary Stims on would not yield, 
but announced that all American troops would be removed by 
t he fall of 1932 . On January 2 , 1933, the last United States 
marines left Nicaragua . 2 
With the departure of these troops, American armed 
intervention came to an end in Central America. Those years 
left behind a s pirit of fear and distrust t hat even today is 
hard to live down . 
l Peck, ~ · ci~ ., pp . 394, 395. 
2Wilgus, ~ · git ., pp . 717, 718 . 
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VIII. THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY 
In his first inagural address, given on March 4, 
1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt declared: 
In the field of world policy, I would dedicate 
this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the 
neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, be-
cause he does so, respects the rights of others--
the neighbor who respects his obligations and 
respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with 
a world of neighbors.l 
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At first glance, this declaration may be somewhat 
meaningless, for it did not commit the United States to any 
definite course of actions. However, by the time of 
Roosevelt's death twelve years later, few persons in the 
Western Hemisphere had not heard of his rrGood Neighbor 
Policy". Roosevelt and his policy secured an unprecedented 
popularity among the Latin Americans. This was largely due 
to the hands-off principle that was adopted and maintained 
by the New Deal Administration. 
Not only in Central America, but throughout all of 
Latin America, governments had a complete respite from 
North American intervention. The hands-off policy was 
applied to all governments whether they were democratic, 
dictatorial or otherwise. The United States--the champion 
-------
lEdward o. Guerrant, Roosevent'~ QpQg Neighbor Policy 
(Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1950), 
p. 1. 
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of democracy--even though it was pa ·.adoxical, because very 
friendly with reactionary and totalitarian Latin American 
governments. Naturally, the governments of Latin America 
were heartily in favor of non-intervention, for they were 
not made subject to possible interference. The only 
deviation that was made from this principle was when mild 
economic sanctions were used against Argentina when that 
nation was making friendly gestures to the Axis powers 
during the early years of the Second World War. These 
sanctions were lifted with Argentina's declaration of war 
against Germany in 1945.1 
The theories of President Roosevelt were 
readily considered to be more trustworthy when the United 
States, without reservation, joined the other delegates at 
the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, and signed the 
following protocol: 
'The High Contractive Parties declare inadmiss-
ible the intervention of any one of them, directly 
or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the 
internal or external affairs of any of the Parties. 
The violation of the provisions of this Article 
shall give rise to mutual consultation with the 
object of exchanging views and seeking methods of 
peaceful adjustment.' 
This non-intervention protocol was signed by 
all twenty-one American nations. The United States 
delegation appended no reservation to this conven-
tion, and Latin Americans were at last convinced 
lrbid., pp. 17, 18. 
that the Roosevelt Administration had completely 
abandoned the principle of intervention.! 
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The Central American delegates wanted an even strong-
er assurance that non-intervention would be prohibited. 
They urged this point, for they had more frequently been 
the subjects of intervention than other nations. Their 
suggestions were not incorporated in the convention, which 
had the legal effect of a treaty, but a joint declaration 
was adopted. 
The salient points in this Declaration of 
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-
operation were as follows: the American nations 
'proclaim their absolute juridical sovereignty, 
their unqualified respect for their respective 
sovereignties and the existence of a common democ-
racy throughout America.' In addition they de-
clared that the American nations accepted the 
following principles: 
'(a) Proscription of territorial conquest and 
that, in consequence, no acquisition made through 
violence shall be recognized; (b) Intervention by 
one State in the internal or external affairs of 
another State is condemned; (c) Forcible collec-
tion of pecuniary debts is illegal; and (d) Any 
difference or dispute between the American nations, 
whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by 
the methods of conciliation, or unrestricted 
arbitration, .or through operation of international justice.' 
Although the Central Americans would have 
preferred a convention rather than a declaration, 
one authority stated that these nations considered 
this Declaration a 'sort of Magna Charta of 
American freedom and collective security.' 
libig., pp. 11, 12. 
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Sumner Welles summarized the net results of the 
Conference: 
If there is one thing above all other, that the 
Government · of t he United States stand for in its 
relations hip with t he other re publics of this 
hemisphere, it is its utter unwillingness to inter-
fere, directly or indirectly in the domestic con-
cerns of those nations . l 
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The policy of non-intervention was altered somewhat 
during the Administration of President Truman . The State 
Department developed the idea of multilateral intervention 
as opposed to unilateral intervention. The advocates of 
this principle felt that t here would be occasions when 
intervention perha ps would be necessary to prevent the 
development of Fascism in this hemisphere, but believed 
t hat it would be justified only as "collective multi-lateral 
action after full consultation among the republics," and 
not as unilateral intervention by the United States alone. 
The United States committed itself to this policy at the 
Rio de Janeiro Conference of August, 1947. Under t his 
agreement, in t he event of aggression or threat of aggres-
sion, united action may be taken by the American nations, 
even to the use of armed force to preserve the peace. 2 
No occasion has yet arisen for t he application of 
the Rio de Janeiro treaty, and it appears to be a strong 
libi~., pp . 12, 13 . 
2rbig., pp. 18-20 . 
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element in the preservation of the peace. Perhaps an out-
standing example of non-intervention was revealed when the 
American government refrained fro~ using armed intervention 
to bring about the overthrow of the Arbenz government in 
the Republic of Guatemala during the spring and summer of 
1954. The United States was willing to wait until exiled 
Guatemalans could organize, invade the country, and bring 
about the downfall of the Communist controlled government. 
The author was a resident of Central America at the time 
and was a witness to many documented proofs that clearly 
revealed that the Arbenz regime was a Communist government 
which operated under instructions from Russia. These facts 
were clear to the officials of the American State Depart-
ment. True, the Americans did much in negotiations that 
were conducted behind the scenes, but in respect to 
American military intervention, the United States kept 
11 hands off .u 
The Good Neighbor Policy and the fact that the United 
States has for many years refused to intervene directly in 
Central American politics cannot be emphasized too greatly. 
During this period the governments of all these five small 
nations once again expressed their solidarity with the 
United States by declaring war immediately against Japan on 
December 8, 1941, and on Germany and Italy by December 12. 
May we now consider that Central Americans have implicit 
> 
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confidence in the United States' government, and no longer 
l ook with distrust upon the "Great Colossus of the North"? 
Has the United States abandoned armed intervention to 
adopt other methods that are more subtle and yet suffici-
ently effective to bring about the domination of these 
Central American states? An attempt to answer these 
questions and a further discussion of modern political 
and economic developments in Central America is deferred 
until a later place in the discussion. 
> 
CHAPTER III 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED 
FRUIT COMPANY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Two great forces, the United States and the United 
Fruit Company, have played a dominant part in shaping the 
development of the countries of Central America. Both have 
been declared to be imperialistic in their practices. The 
first power frequently has been openly criticised for using 
political, military, and economic tactics to achieve its 
desired goals, and the second power likewise has been 
accused of employing i mperialistic methods that have been 
largely economic, but just as potent. 
In the section just completed, a brief analysis of 
the United States' intervention in Central America was 
presented. Before giving an interpretation of what was or 
was not accomplished as a result of American official action, 
it seems advisable first to survey the activities of an 
American private corporation, the United Fruit Company. 
This organization developed during the period when 
American intervention was extremely frequent, yet the United 
Fruit Comoany was able to boast that it has never called for 
a marine or a battleship to protect its interests. None was 
needed, for it has been more powerful than many nations, and 
has been able to do its own negotiating. With the use of 
economic force, it has been able to protect itself quite 
well.l 
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Few American firms that have operated in foreign 
countries have been subjected to more criticism, both at 
home and in the foreign sectors of their operations. An 
attempt will be made in this section to give an objective 
revaluation of the activities of the United Fruit Company 
in the Central American sector, but again the conclusions 
that may be drawn have been deferred to another portion of 
the study. 
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE UN ITED FRUIT COMPANY 
One cannot give an adequate discussion of the devel-
opment of the United Fruit Company without giving due credit 
to a men who has often been called its founder--Minor c. 
Keith. Shortly after his death The Nation eulogized him by 
writing: 
Perhaps the most important figure in the entire 
history of the Central Americ~--the man who has done 
most to steer the destinies of the Caribbean coun-
tries--was Minor c. Keith. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Upon his tomb might well be inscribed the words, 
'he built railroads and planted bananas.' Those were 
his major activities and with them for more than half 
a century he remade nations. When he died his dream 
l"Empire Builder," _Ihg Nation, CXXIX (July 3, 1929), 5. 
of a railroad that should link North America with 
the South was still five hundred miles short of 
fulfilment, but he had built the major links, some 
of them over swampy jungle land where neither white 
man nor red had been able to live; and he proved 
that they could be made to pay. He planted bananas 
to provide freight for his railways, and with his 
bananas transformed the whole East coast of c. A. 
His name was a byword in four republics, all of 
which at times virtually put the entire settlement 
of their foreign debts in his hands.'l 
Minor c. Keith went to live in Costa Rica at the age 
of twenty-three, married a Costa Rican girl, and grew up 
with the country. His uncle, Henry Meiggs, had gained 
quite a reputation as a railroad builder in Chile and Peru. 
l1eiggs is reported to have said upon looking at the tower-
ing Andes, "Anywhere a llama can go I can take a train." 
In 1871, Minor C. Keith, his uncle Meiggs, and Minor's three 
brothers went to Costa Rica to construct a railroad from 
the tropical coast line on the Caribbean coast to the capital 
at San Jose in the highlands. The Costa Rican government 
knew that the project would be a difficult one, and it was 
for that reason that the Keiths were asked to take the job. 
The proposed railroad was to start at Limon on the 
coast. The region was filled with swamps, tangled jungles, 
mosquitos and tropical fever. Costa Ricans refused to work 
in the area, so laborers were brought from the United States 
and hundreds of Negroes were imported from Jamaica. 
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During the first year only four miles of track were 
laid, and in the second twenty were added . But the cost 
was tremendous--both in money and in lives . The tropical 
fevers were responsible for most of the casualties. Just 
to lay those twenty-four miles of track, four thousand 
lives were lost, including those of Henry Meiggs, and Minor 
Keith's three brothers . Keith himself survived many fever 
1 
attacks and carried on alone . 
The Costa Rican government began to run out of money, 
and the road had not reached the coffee producing highlands, 
so Keith had to develop some type of product to carry for 
frei ght on the railroads. His line went into the s\rnmps 
and there terminated. However, Keith was not to be defeated. 
Keith formed a partners hip with Carl B. Franc, who 
had banana plantations in Panama . Soon flourishing banana 
plants were to be found growing in the lowlands near Keith's 
Costa Rican railway . Within not too many months, the Keith-
Franc partnership was exporting bananas to the United States . 
Meanwhile the railroad continued to penetrate the steaming 
jungles and the locomotives that freighted out the expanding 
banana crops also carried the corpses of the railroad workers 
that daily succumbed to the rigors of the jungle. 
lAnne Merriman Peck, The Pageant of Mi~ American 
History (New York: Longman's Green, and Company, 1947), 
p. 319 . 
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The banana busiJness boomed. Kei th soon planted his 
bananas in Nicaragua a1so. General stores were established 
in some of the eastern Nicaraguan port towns. Limon was 
cleaned up; seawalls were cons true ted to prevent floods; 
the swamps that bred ~osquitos were filled in; and a 
different situation existed after Keith and his associates 
took over . 
In 1890, after nineteen years of stupendous achieve-
ments, the Costa Rica ~ailroad was completed. Even today, 
as one rides over this railroad, the traveler cannot help 
but marvel as the traclcs cross the steamy swamps through 
the tangles of tropical jungles, wind and twist their way 
over and through the moutains, and span the deep gorges on 
narrow trestles to reach t he capital city of San Jose . The 
completion of this line made Minor C. Keith a famous and 
highly respected character in Costa Rica .1 
~hile Keith was building his railroads and develop-
ing his banana enterprises, other organizations were engaged 
in the expanding bana~ industry. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, about twenty groups had a definite interest 
in the banana trade. In 1870, the year before Keith started 
in Costa Rica, Lorenzo D. Baker started to transport bananas 
from Jamaica to the United States. He found the business 
libid.' p. 328. 
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profitable, so soon he joined with Andrew W. Preston and 
eight others to form the Boston Fruit Company. The organi-
zation grew at a rapid rate and by 1890 it was conserva-
tively estimated to be worth $531,000. The activities of 
the Boston Fruit Company soon were expanded into Cuba and 
Santo Domingo, as well as having a profitable growth in 
Jamaica . 1 
In 1899, the Keith interests (which by this time 
had expanded into Columbia), amalgamated with the Boston 
Fruit Company, and the United Fruit Company came into being. 
The new corporation paid the Boston Fruit Company $5,200,000 
for its assets and the Keith interests received $4,000,000 . 
By the end of the first year, the new United Fruit Company 
owned 112 miles of railroad, and 212,394 acres of land, of 
which 61,263 were improved. Expansion has been the policy 
from the very start and there has been a tendency to move 
westward . Sugar production soon took over the Cuban lands, 
and eventually the Santo Domingo lands were entirely abandoned. 
Only in Jamaica are bananas still being raised by the United 
Fruit Company on the old lands of the Boston Fruit Company. 
Most of the later expansion came in Central America where 
the Keith enterprises had a secure foothold. 2 
lcharles David Kepner , Jr. and Jay Henry Soothill, Th6 
Bansna Em~ire (New York : The Vanguard Press, 1935), pp. 33-3 • 
2Jbid. 
67 
II. THE UNITED FRUIT CO P NY EXPANDS BY EC01 OdiC 
CONqUEST l.PD CON!:lOLIDATION 
The United Fruit Company was determined that the 
banana trade of Central merica was to be exclusively under 
its control, and history shows that with very few exceptions 
it achieved the desired goal. 
In 1905, several independent organizations vlhich were 
engaged in the banana trade in the Caribbean area united 
under the name of ~tlantic Fruit Company to challenge the 
domination of United Fruit Company in Central America . 
Being unable to secure a footing o~ financial stability , 
the Atlantic Fruit Company sold 51 per cent of its stock 
to the Harquis de Iaury, a man to vlhom it owed much money 
for fruit purchases. From him the stock was transferred to 
a brokerage house in New York mich held it for the United 
Fruit Company . The Atlantic Fruit Company brought suit 
against the United Fruit Company for buying up its stock, 
declaring that the United had violated the Sherman ·nti-
Trust Law by controling their competition. The Atlant ic 
Fruit Company lost the suit , but the United had received a 
warning . 
For five years the officials of the ti·Jo companies 
earned money together, but the association appears to have 
been anything but harmonious . Finally, it was urged so 
strongly by Atlantic that one group should buy the other 
--
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out, that United sold back its Atlantic stock to the Atlantic 
Fruit Company . Atlantic was so eager to regain control that 
it was willing to pay a high price for the stock that United 
possessed . The United Fruit Company , however , was not 
entirely the loser , for it sold stock that had cost $31 per 
share for the book value price of $123 per share . l 
The Atlantic Fruit Company then reorganized and form-
ed a stronger firm known as the Atlantic Fruit and Steamship 
Company . The new company was again anxious to se cure a 
portion of the banana trade in Costa Rica . The United was 
even more determined that its domain should not be invaded . 
The United controlled a large portion of the railroad and 
the docking facilities, so frequently the Atlantic ship-
ments of bananas could be delayed and held up until the 
fruit would start to spoil . On other occasions, the bananas 
were even chopped up by men and their machetes operating 
under instructions from the United . 2 The United Fruit 
libid .' pp . 64- 66 . 
2This information was obtained from Mr . Soothill , 
one of the authors of The Banana Empire, Q£ . git . and is 
fully explained in the footnote reference for page 67 of 
lh~ E~nana Empire . He was in charge of one of the gangs 
that was commissioned to do this type of work, and narrow-
ly escaped being shot by one of the indignant farmers . 
Shortly thereafter he became secretary to the general 
superintendent of the United Fruit Company's Costa Rica 
Division. 
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Company, being a much larger concern, purchased or leased 
at high prices the land which was to produce Atlantic's 
fruit. Again, the Atlantic resorted to the courts, but the 
United was not forced to retreat . This legal action was 
taken in Central America, but the Costa Rican courts would 
not condemn the United Fruit Company. On July 27, 1912, 
~he Atlantic Fruit and Steamship Company decided to with-
draw from the banana business in Costa Rica, for it felt 
that the conditions were too unequal to permit competition.l 
The United Fruit Company thus had a virtual monopoly 
on the Costa Rican trade until it was challenged again in 
1927. This time, a co-operative association of banana 
growers and the Cuyamel Fruit Company tried to secure some 
of the lucrative banana business . Again the United Fruit 
Company had the upper hand. The United controlled the 
railroad and thus could control the shipping rates for the 
competition. The ships also were under the control of the 
United and they refused to carry the fruit of a rival even 
though their ships had space for the extra freight. The 
United renewed its contracts with the major portion of the 
Costa Rican planters so that the rival firms would be unable 
to purchase fruit from them for ten years . The cooperatives 
tried to secure guarantees from the government that they 
1Ibid., pp . 67, 69 . 
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would not be discriminated against on the railroads operated 
by the United but the government refused such a guarantee, 
probably because Cuyamel failed to press the matter. Soon 
the idea of purchasing fruit in Costa Rica was abandoned by 
the cooperatives and the Cuyamel. The Cuyamel Fruit Company 
did not force the issue for it was trying to maneuver into 
a position so that it could force the United Fruit Company 
to purchase Cuyamel. 1 
While the United Fruit Company was conquering its 
rivals on the Atlantic coast, two other organizations were 
developing on the Pacific side of Costa Rica. However, 
neither company grew to sufficient size to threaten the 
dominance of the United. The United Fruit Company did not 
force these firms out of business, but gradually through 
purchase of stock has made them subsidiaries of its vast 
organization. One of the companies, the Perris Farm and 
Trading Company,was still reported as independent in 1934, 
but the United at present has a stock control of the corpora-
tion. The other firm, the Gulf of Dulce Land Company, since 
1932 is by all indications a subsidiary of the United Fruit 
Company. 2 
Shortly after the organization of the United Fruit 
1rbid., pp. 70-76. 
21bid., pp. 82-87. 
Company, Minor C. Keith turned his attention again to the 
building of railroads. This time it was in Guatemala. A 
few lines had been constructed from the Pacific Coast to 
the capital city, using English finance, but the govern-
ment had lost its credit and the important line that was 
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to connect the capital with the Caribbean port of Puerto 
Carrios had never been completed. A portion of the railroad 
had been built from Puerto Barrios inland as far as El Rancho. 
Keith surveyed the situation and decided that the 
short line that had been constructed from Puerto Barrios 
inland could be made to pay if it only had more freight. As 
first vice·:Jresident of the United Fruit Company, Keith 
persuaded the new firm to start banana plantations along 
this railroad. Keith then joined other railroad financiers 
and proposed to the Guatemalan government that they be 
permitted to purchase the unfinished line with the agreement 
that Keith and his associates would complete its construction. 
The government accepted the proposal, and the Keith organiza-
tion finished the line on personal credit and rebuilt most 
of the old construction. The railroad holdings of Keith in 
Guatemala gradually increased, until by 1912, he was able to 
finance in England a corporation that was called the Inter-
national Railways of Central America. This company, by 
purchase, took over all the railroads in Guatemala and in 
Salvador. The lines in Salvador were later enlarged until 
... 
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the little nation became fairly well served by the Interna-
tional Railroad. Keith's dream was to have a complete system 
of railroads that would extend from Mexico to Panama. As 
yet, his dream has never become a reality.l 
When the Keith organization gained complete control 
of the Guatemalan railroads, the United Fruit Company found 
it unnecessary to build lines of its own to transport its 
"7 
fruit to Puerto Barrios on the Caribbean. The United Fruit 
Company has declared vehemently that it does not own the 
International Railways of Central America, but none can 
deny that they have had a common ancestor in Minor c. Keith. 
Keith was the first vice ~-president of the United Fruit 
Company from 1899 to 1921, and was president of the Inter-
national Railways of Central America from 1912 until shortly 
before his death in 1929. Both companies have had inter-
locking directorates, and at times the published prospectus 
of the railroad has listed the United Fruit Company spurs 
as a part of its property. The United Fruit Company many 
times serves as a direct agent for purchases that are needed 
by the railroad.2 
Time MAgazine , in the issue of October 12, 1936, 
lsamuel Crowther, The Romance ~ Rise of thg American 
~~ (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 
1929), pp. 157-159. 
2Kepner, ~· cit., pp. 157-164. 
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stated that the United Fruit Company has invested about 
$10,ooo,ooo in the International Railways of Central America. 
According to a contract that was revealed to the public in 
October of 1936, the two parties agreed to maintain favor-
able relations, and in so doing, the United Fruit Company 
would provide the railroad with freight, additional railroad 
equipment, and ballast from the company mifi.es on favorable 
terms. The United Fruit Company also gave the International 
Railways of Central America $2,165,000 in cash. They 
received in return twenty-year notes for $1,7 50,000, and 
185,000 new common shares. Tim~ then estin~ted that the 
United Fruit Company had acquired an approximate 31% interest 
in the Central American railway.l 
In commenting upon this relationship, Dana G. Munro 
states: 
Besides the numerous lines built expressly for 
carrying bananas from the farms to the wharves, the 
Fruit Company, or concerns allied to it, con~rols 
the entire railway system of Guatemala, a large 
part of that of Salvador, and the most important 
road, from San Jose to Puerto Limon, in Costa Rica. 
The few independent growers along its lines are 
completely at its mercy, for they have no alterna-
tive but to sell their fruit to it under the con-
ditions which it dictates.2 
The very close relationship that exists between the 
l"Banana Road, u Time, XXVIII, (October 12, 1936) , 76. 
2nana G. Munro, The ~ Republics of Q~ntral Americg 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp.~, 270. 
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two corporations is also very clearly illustrated by the 
favoritism that is shown the United Fruit Company . Freight 
rates are much cheaper on shipments of coffee and other 
freight that is directed toward Puerto Barrios than the 
shipments that are destined for the Pacific ports . From 
~uerto Barrios, the United Fruit Company ships its bananas 
and commercial cargo, while the Pacific ports are served 
by other steamship companies . As a natural consequence, 
most of the coffee exports, which is Guatemala's chief 
product for exportation, and a large portion of the 
commercial traffic, are routed through Puerto Barrios, and 
the United Fruit Company is able to reap the profits.l 
ith such a favorable transportation arrangement in 
Guatemala, it has been no wonder that the United Fruit 
Company has developed its business there with little com-
petition from other organizations wanting to enter the 
field of banana production. 
In Honduras, immediately to the south of Guatemala, 
the picture was different . Instead of comparatively little 
opposition, here the United Fruit Company had to struggle 
fiercely in order to dominate the fruit business. Although 
Honduras is in the center of Central America, possesses 
vast coastal areas ideal for banana production, and bananas 
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have been raised there for export since 1860, only in the 
twentieth century have large corporations come to control 
the lucrative tropical fruit business of this small country . 
It was in Honduras that a Bessarabian immigrant 
named Samuel Zemurray first came into real prominence in 
the banana export trade . Zemurray, next to Minor Keith 
perhaps the best-known "Yankee" involved in the financial 
and political affairs of the "banana republics It, had come 
to the United States and found a business opportunity in 
Ne Orleans. At the start of this century, he asked United 
Fruit officials in that city for a contract to purchase 
bananas which had ripened, or started to turn brown, on 
the voyage from the plantations. In the past these "ripesn 
had been thrown overboard as undesirable. 
Zemurray did not reveal the purpose for which he 
desired the nripes • 11 United officials presumed he would 
utilize them in the making of alcohol, and saw no harm in 
realizing a small profit from material which had been con-
sidered as waste. The contract was therefore granted, but 
Zemurray soon was selling the fruit to the public at such 
a low price that United began to feel an adverse effect upon 
its local business. Zemurray, however, cannily refused to 
surrender his profitable contract until he secured a promise 
from the United Fruit Company of financial backing for his 
purchase of the Streich banana plantations in Honduras. 
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William F. Streich, of Philadelphia, had been given land 
concessions by the Honduran govermnent in order to engage 
in banana production on a large scale. Lack of funds pre-
vented development of the project as he had anticipated, 
and he was ready to sell to Zemurray and the United Fruit 
Company. 
The United Fruit Company assisted Zemurray in the 
organization of the Hubbard-Zemurray Company, with United 
Fruit owning sixty per cent of the stock. Zemurray then 
proceeded to raise bananas himself. United Fruit sold its 
stock in the new firm and perhaps felt Zemurray would be 
forced into bankruptcy when his debts with the United Fruit 
Company would come due. Such was not the case. In 1911, 
he secured new financial backing and organized the Cuyamel 
Fruit Company and at the same time used his new capital to 
become financially independent of the United Fruit Company. 
Within a few years, the United Fruit Company had its most 
powerful competitor in Honduras. 1 Samuel Zemurray also 
later proved to be a powerful influence in Central American 
politics. 
Before either the United Fruit Company or Zerourray 
had active interests in Honduras, the Vaccaro Brothers in 
1899 started a banana plantation near La Ceiba, which is 
lKepner, QQ. cit., pp. 100-102. 
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the largest of the Honduran cities . Their activities quickly 
expanded until they were not only engaged in banana produc-
tion but also found profit in sugar, soap, steamship lines, 
distilleries, a shoe factory, and a bank. At present this 
organization is commonly known as the Standard Fruit Company, 
and it is significant that it has successfully worked in an 
area where the United Fruit Company is believed to have 
desired a complete monopoly . ! 
Sam Zemurray's Cuyamel Fruit Company, and the Vaccaro 
Brothers' Standard Fruit Company were well established in 
Honduras when the United Fruit Company commenced its opera-
tions in this portion of Central America . The United Fruit 
Company secured its start in Honduras through its railroad 
subsidiaries, the Tela Railroad Company and the Truxillo 
Railroad Company. These two railroad companies had secured 
from the Honduran government large tracts of land in connec-
tion with their railroad construction contracts . On this 
land in 1914, only a year after the land concessions were 
granted, the United Fruit Company had approximately 15,000 
acres under cultivation, or about one-half as much as the 
land area it operated in Guatemala, and one-third the size 
of its large holdings in Costa Rica . By 1924, or only ten 
years after the Tela and Truxillo railroad companies had 
1 Ibid . , p. 102. 
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started to operate in Honduras, the United Fruit Company had 
under cultivation 87,808 acres of land, or three times its 
cultivation in Columbia and Guatemala and five times its 
cultivation in Panama and Costa Rica. The United has per-
haps expanded more rapidly in Honduras than in any other 
place largely because of the great extent of excellent land 
that is available for the cultivation of the banana. Of its 
Honduran land, both improved and unimproved, out of a total 
of 400,000 acres about 175,000 acres were received as sub-
sidy for railroad construction and did not cost the company 
a peP~y.1 
Had it not been for the keen competition that devel-
oped in the United States over the marketing of the fruit, 
the Cuyamel and the United Fruit Companies would perhaps 
have continued to exist as rivals in the banana business in 
Honduras. However, Cuyamel specialized in production of a 
larger banana, thus providing the American public with 
superior fruit, and made a sizable profit in its operation. 
The market value of Cuyamel's stock rose from a price range 
of $51-$32 in 1926 to $126-$63 in 1929. The competition of 
this growing company was hurting the United Fruit Company's 
market in the United States. Consequently, in December, 
1929, the United Fruit Company negotiated to purchase the 
lrbid., pp. 112-113. 
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Cuyamel Fruit Company for 300,000 shares of no par United 
Fruit Company stock, which at that time was worth $32,000, 
000. Sam Zemurray, the founder of Cuyamel, received one-
half of the 300,000 shares of the United Fruit Company, 
and by 1934 was able to dictate to the company from which 
in earlier years he had purchased over-ripe bananas to sell 
on the streets of New Orleans . l 
At the time of its purchase by the United Fruit 
Company, the Cuyamel had a sugar refining plant that was 
capable of producing 1,500 tons of sugar daily; 16 steam-
ships; 145 miles of railroads; and 250,000 acres of land, 
of which 22,149 in Honduras and 12,450 in other areas were 
under actual banana cultivation. The fixed assets of 
Cuyamel were estimated at about $26,ooo,ooo . The United 
Fruit Company thus purchased its chief competitor and 
became a $242,000,000 corporation which ruled the banana 
empire. Only the Standard Fruit Company remains as a 
major competitor in Central America, and it appears to 
desire to work with the United Fruit Company rather than 
oppose it . 2 
When the depression came, the shares of United Fruit 
declined from $158 to $26 . As Zemurray l ooked at the 
lrbid., pp . 130-133. 
21bi~ . , pp. 130-133. 
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situation, his opinion of the United Fruit leadership shrank 
in proportion. He was determined that the company president, 
Victor M. Cutter, and his associates should go . Zemurray 
went to t he historic Boston meeting in January of 1933 to 
take action. Tradition states that Zemurray tossed his 
bale of proxies and stock certificates on the director's 
table with the statement, "You ' ve been bitching up this 
business too long . " The Cutter regime collapsed and Zemurray 
became the boss . l At present Sam Zemurray is listed as 
Chairman of the Executive Committee in the Annual Report of 
the United Fruit Company for 1954 . 
Today the United Fruit Company carries on extensive 
operations in four of the five Central American republics: 
Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua . Only in 
Salvador, where land is not too suitable for the production 
of the banana, do we find the absence of the United Fruit. 
However, the International Railways of Central America, 
which serves Salvador, play a dominant role in the little 
nation's economy, and as we have noted in this chapter, there 
seems clear evidence that this railroad is very closely re -
lated to the United Fruit . 
111 Banana Split ala Zemurray," Business Jeek (N1ay 4, 
1946) , p . 47 . 
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III. THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY AND POLITICS 
In order for a foreign corporation such as the United 
Fruit Company to begin operation in Central America, it is 
necessary for it to secure the proper permission from the 
governments in whose terr itories it wishes to conductfts 
business. Therefore, concessions and land grants or pur-
chases are sought from the political leaders of the nations 
involved. In these negotiations, it has become very easy 
for large American firms to become very much entangled in 
the politics of Central America . 
J.1ost of the fruit companies operating in Central 
America have obtained their concessions from the governments 
under the terms that they build a railroad from the coastal 
town into the interior and on to the capital city. The 
United Fruit Company in Honduras agreed to construct a rail-
road from the North Coast to Tegucigalpa. From the govern-
ment, t he Company received in return the right to appropriate 
for its own use amounts of land varying from 250 to 500 
hectares (that is from 617.5 to 1,235 acres) for every kilo-
meter constructed along the main line and its branches. The 
Company also was allowed to improve the ports from which its 
ships sailed, and was permitted to charge fees to other 
exporters that used its facilities.l 
l Munro, Q.l2• cit., p. 134. 
The object of the Honduran government in making 
these concessions was to provide a means of communication 
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that would link the North Coast with the capital. This link 
has never been completed, and the railroads are still only 
to be found in the rich lowlands where the land is ideal for 
the cultivation of the banana. The situation seems to 
indicate that the fruit company is only interested in build-
ing its roads in the regions where they best can be used to 
transport its bananas. Many branch lines have been built, 
but only in the banana districts. Of course, the Company 
becomes the owner of more tillable land with every kilometer 
of railroad that is constructed, be it a main line or a 
branch line. Most of the contracts that have given conces-
sions to the United Fruit Company and others have obligated 
the firms to extend the railroad into the interior towns 
within a specified period of time, but the Central American 
governments have been unable to enforce these provisions of 
the contracts.1 The governments have not confiscated the 
land for fear the companies would remove their business to 
other lands and thus the little nations would lose a major 
source of income. 
In some sections of Central America, the railroads 
are obviously constructed so as to bring benefit to the 
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fruit companies, that they have been called "the railroads 
that run in circles." They leave the ports, go out into 
the banana plantations and return t~ the original port again. 
Despite the fact that the United Fruit Company owns or con-
trols thousands of acres of land in Central America, there 
is at present still no network of railroads connecting the 
five small republics. In Honduras, for example, where the 
United Fruit Company owns its greatest acreage, there is no 
railroad to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts, 
and Tegucigalpa is one of the very few national capitals of 
the world that as yet has no railroad service. 
Munro attempts to explain the reasons and the results 
of such exploitation in Honduras as follows: 
The desire to secure railway communication between 
the ca pital and the North Coast has been so strong 
that valuable and far-reaching privileges have often 
been granted, with little consideration and with no 
effective safeguards, to companies which have promised 
more than they had any intentions of carrying out; and 
other concessions, often actually prejudicial to the 
interests of the Republic, have been secured occasion-
ally by foreigners who have aided revolutionary leaders 
in securing control of the government. Because of the 
lessons learned through many hard experiences with 
unscrupulous promoters, however, the native authorities 
are much more cautious of late about investigating the 
character and financial standing of persons applying 
to them for favors, and the majority of the contracts 
recently entered into have been more equitable in their 
terms and more explicit in their provisions than those 
of former years.l 
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ot only have the fruit companies been critici %ed for 
their failures to comply with their contracts , but i t has 
been st~ted that t hey have fomented and financed revolu-
tions in order to ad vance or rna ntain their economic con-
trol . A Honduran revolution that for a time centered about 
sam zemurray has been c ted as an example of a revolt that 
was sponsored by a fru t company . 
~en President Aiquel R. Davila took over the 
~onduran Government n the spring of 1907 , his position was 
not only unstable, but perilous . This instability was largely 
a result of t e tremendous foreign debt that Honduras possessed . 
t the same t ~e, the new president soon beca e disliked by 
Sam Zemurray , for Davila 1as granting too many favors to 
Ze urra ' s ' competitors . The debt had resulted from efforts 
put forth in the construction of a railroad that was supposed 
to have led eventually from the Caribbean to the Gulf of 
Fonseca . The Project was first organized in the early 1850 ' s 
by the Honduran Government in cooperation with British bcnkerso 
Several oreanizations atte~pted to build the railroad 
but all either collapsed from financial instability or 
abandoned the plan in discouragement . Consequently, by 1908 
only fifty - nine miles of the railroad had been uilt, it had 
become a humble banana line, and the Government was saddled 
with a public debt of over a hundred million dollars. To 
ps 
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add urgency to the situation, the British bondholders were 
wanting either their money or a share in the banana rail-
road that was rapidly developing into a profitable business .l 
While Davila was trying to arrange loans from American 
banks in 1910 to satisfy the demands of the British credit-
ors, one of Davila ' s political enemies was preparing to move 
against him. Manuel Bonilla, a former Honduran dictator who 
had lost control of the Government in 1907, had outfitted 
an expedition in New Orleans, British Honduras, and Guatemala, 
and attacked the north coast of Honduras in the summer of 
1910. This first expedition resulted in failure, but Bonilla 
was not to be discouraged . Zemurray , who wanted Davila 
ousted for business reasons, backed Bonilla financially in 
the preparation of another campaign against Davila . Bonilla's 
forces captured the Bay Islands January 1, 1911, and in a 
few days seized Trujillo . 2 
Meanwhile, Davila was trying to secure the loan 
treaties with the United States so that his own position 
would be strengthened in Honduras . As Bonilla's forces were 
victoriously advancing along the coast, Davila cabled the 
United States and stated that Honduras was ready to approve 
the loan conventions, but requested American intervention to 
lJ . Fred Rippy, Th! Caribbe~n Danger ~Qng (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Cons, 1940 , pp. 20 -209 . 
2This is the proper spe ling for the na e of the city 
although the railroad company has persisted in using an "x" 
instead of a 11 j 11 in the same name . 
p 
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terminate the progressing revolution. However, before the 
United States had time to decide on a policy, the Honduran 
Congress refused to ratify the loan convention, so Davila's 
hopes for the stable government were lost. Davila resigned, 
and Bonilla was permitted to appoint Francisco Bertrand as 
provisional fresident.l 
The American State Department tried to continue with 
the loan negotiations, but the United States Senate would 
not ratify the plans. By this time, Manuel Bonilla had 
become president of Honduras. He too balked on the loan 
contracts, so the agreement lapsed. 
Bonilla and Bertrand were not adverse to the idea of 
securing loans, but they were desirous that their friend 
Sam Zemurray should be the one to obtain them. Zemurray 
was not only a banana merchant, but he was in pursuit of 
loan commi ssions as well. Through New Orleans bankers he 
secured an agreement for a half million dollar preliminary 
loan, to be followed by another ten million. Honduras 
promptly ratified the plan. The money delivered was used 
to defray the expenses of the revolution of 1911, and it is 
quite possible that a large share was turned over to Zemurray 
to reimburse hi m for his aid to Bonilla. Despite Zemurray's 
assistance, the ten million dollars never was loaned to 
1 Ibid., pp. 210-212. 
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Honduras because the bankers felt the loan could not be 
properly secured by Honduras. Zemurray, on the other hand, 
was able to negotiate very valuable banana concessions from 
the friendly Bonilla Government.l 
The British bondholders had to wait until 1926 to 
achieve their financial settlement with Honduras, but 
Zemurray's power in Central America was greatly strengthened 
and consolidated through his sponsorship of Bonilla in the 
revolution of 1911. 
hy should Central American governments appear so 
eager to grant liberal concessions to the fruit companies? 
Charles Kepner, Jr. and Jay Henry Soothill give an interesting 
discussion of the factors involved in their book, The Banana 
Empire, from which the following quotations are taken: 
Considering that concessions enable the United 
Fruit Company and other large corporations to 
throttle competitors, to control many phases of the 
life of Caribbean countries, and to escape the pay-
ment of numerous taxes, one may well ponder the 
willingness of Caribbean governments to grant such 
concessions. W~n is politically near-sighted. The 
immediate advantage of a loan or the spectacular 
launching of a railway project weighs more heavily 
with the ambitious politician than the ultimate 
well-being of his country in the unknown future. 
Moreover, many a national leader, who may in part 
realize that this procedure is bartering the nation's 
birthright of independence for immediate advantages, 
feels that even so it is a case of Hobson's choice, 
of making this sacrifice or not having national 
agriculture of industry developed.2 
------
lrbid., PP· 213-216. 2Kepner, ~· cit., p. 215. 
-Officials and higher employees of the fruit 
companies know how to play the host in their homes, 
in clubs, or at large gatherings. On such occa-
sions as when the United's Costa Rican manager took 
thirty-two congressmen on a tour of the banana 
regions, ending with a banquet on one of the ships 
of the Great White Fleet, and when other company 
representatives conducted a sightseeing expedition 
for Chamorrista deputies to the radio station out-
side 1~nagua, congeniality, food and 'nectar of the 
gods' have conditioned attitudes receptive to the 
pleas of the company . l 
The usual threat is that if a particular country 
will not accede to the company's demands the latter 
will pull up stakes and carry on its activities in 
other, more congenial lands. In 1928 Norman E. 
Sanderson, trying to secure favors from Guatemala, 
announced that the company had offers to expand in 
two countries of South America; five years later 
the rumor circulated in Columbia that owing to labor 
difficulties the company auld abandon the latter 
country and concentrate on Central America. Even 
the possibility of removing to Africa has been held 
over the heads of unruly Central American deputies. 
That the United Fruit Company in extreme instances 
could reduce its activities in accordance with such 
threats is indicated by the following excerpt from 
its Annual Report for 1908: 
'The location and extent of the Company's develop-
ment work is and will continue to be influenced by 
the attitude of the respective governments in which 
the properties are located, and governmental inter-
ference or cooperation, as the case may be, ~s a . 
factor in the determination of the locality ln whlch 
development of the business shall be carried on. The 
geographical distri bution of its properties enable 
the company to act with patience and firmness in its 
dealings with the governments!e 
IV. THE UNITED FRUIT C OMP.A NY AND MONO PLY 
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In a civil action filed in New Orleans the week-end 
----------------
libid., p. 219. 2Ibid., p. 222. 
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of July 4, 1954, the Department of Justice charged the United 
Fruit Company with throttling competition in the banana trade 
in Central America. The anti-trusters asked for some kind of 
a break-up of the half-billion dollar empire of United Frui~­
the largest business enterprise in Central America.l The 
Justice Department is not without evidence as once again an 
attempt is being made to ascertain the fact that the United 
Fruit Company has opera ted a· monopoly in Central America. 
At the time of the writing of this study, a decision had not 
as yet been reached in the case, but a brief survey of 
possible charges will aid the reader in understanding why 
the court action is being taken. 
From the very start the United Fruit Company appeared 
determined to dominate the banana trade in Central America. 
In Costa Rica, the United attempted control of the Atlantic 
Fruit Company by the purchase of a sizable block of its 
stock. The Atlantic brought suit against the United under 
the anti-trust laws but was unsuccessful. The United then 
used methods of doubtful legality and forced the Atlantic 
from the Costa Rican banana trade. Banana companies soon 
became subsidiaries of the United on the Pacific coast as 
well. Soon the United Fruit Company stood alone as a domi-
nant banana buyer in Costa Rica. 
l"Oil on Fire," Business Week, (July 10, 1954), 128. 
-90 
In Guatemala, the United Fruit Company controls the 
railroads and all the port facilities in the midst of the 
banana regions, so it has been almost impossible for com-
peting fruit companies to enter that nation. In Honduras, 
where lands are the most suitable for the cultivation of 
the banana industry, two firms have been successful competi-
tors with the United Fruit Company--the Cuyamel and the 
Standard. The Cuyamel and the.United, however, chose to 
unite their forces in the lucrative business. The Standard 
and the United appear to be happy to exist as friendly 
rivals rather than try to exterminate each other. It is 
believed by some Hondurans t hat the United has not tried to 
eliminate the Standard Fruit Company from competition, for 
as long as Standard has a share of the banana business the 
United cannot be accused of operating an absolute monopoly. 
In the realm of transportation there exist other 
factors which in the opinion of some are valid reasons for 
the charges of monopoly. In Central America, the United 
Fruit Company owns 895.25 miles of railroad lines. These 
lines are to be found in three countries and the total 
milage may be broken down as follows: Guatemala, 176.55; 
Costa Rica, 323.31; and Honduras, 395.39.1 The United Fruit 
lAnn~ D&llQrt for thg Ye~ ~ (Boston: United 
Fruit Company, 1954), p. 11. 
... 
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Company and the International Railways of Central America 
(which is considered by many to be a subsidiary of United) 
control almost exclusively the railroad facilities of 
Central America . Since the purchase of the Cuyamel Fruit 
Company, the United Fruit Company operates all the Honduran 
railroads , except a few short lines that are operated by 
the Standard Fruit Company. l In Costa Rica, the United 
Fruit Company operates all the railroad facilities between 
the Central Plateau (which contains the four leading cities 
and most of the population) and the Caribbean coast . 2 
Also in the field of transportation, the United Fruit 
Company controls~ most all of the ships that visit the ports 
of these mid-American countries. In statistics published by 
the company we note that United Fruit's "Great White Fleet" 
is composed of s~ty-four vessels that very adequately 
handle the banana business of the Caribbean area.3 Nine of 
the largest ships each have a capacity of 80,000 stems of 
bananas (at about 150 bananas to the stem, well over ten 
million bananas) . ost of the other ships can carry about 
50,000 stems each . These ships travel as fast as many 
1Kepner, ~· cit., p. 155. 
2Ibid . , p . 170 . 
3Annual Beport for ~hg Yea~ ~ (Boston: United 
Fruit Company, 1954), p . 11. 
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passenger liners (16 to 19 knots), and their hulls are so 
constructed that the delicate fruit is not injured even in 
heavy storms.l 
In a period of between ten and twenty days bananas 
must be harvested, shipped several thousand miles, ripened, 
and then sent out to thousands of grocers where they are 
offered for sale. The fruit company that owns its own 
railroads and steamships has the definite advantage. Since 
the United Fruit Company has its own vast transportation 
system in Central America, and since it has not been will-
ing to permit its competitors to utilize its facilities 
unless prohibitive rates are paid, it is perhaps easy to 
see some reasons for charges of monopoly. 
The United Fruit Company has had other advantages 
which newer and smaller firms cannot expect to attain. The 
United and its subsidiaries came into Central America when 
the small nations were very eager to secure communication 
systems. To induce the introduction of foreign capital, 
generous concessions were given to the United in exchange 
for promises of railroad construction. Thus at the very 
start the local governments hesitated to offend the United, 
for this firm offered the source of employment to more of 
----------------
lTransyor!ation and the ~nana, (New York: 
Fruit Company • 
United 
p:s 
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their nationals than any other organization, and the sala-
ries paid them amounted to millions of dollars annually. 
As a consequence, the United Fruit Company can bring pres-
sure to bear upon the proper government officials so that 
competing concerns canr~t secure the necessary permits to 
start new enterprizes in the fruit business. 
Operations in Honduras have been relatively safe--
as well as profitable. The two firms, the United Fruit 
Company and the Standard Fruit Company, dominate the nation. 
United employs approximately 25,000 men and Standard 11,000. 
Their combined payroll reached nearly $25,ooo,ooo in 1953. 
The labor situation has made Honduras an employer's para-
dise, for up until the present there have been no labor 
unions or labor legislation. (Attempts are now being 
developed to change this situation.) The President of 
Honduras. until December of 1954, Juan Manuel Galvez, was 
formerly a United Fruit Company lawyer. United and Stand-
ard have carefully nourished this desirable position by 
paying higher than average wages and by providing good 
housing facilities. United has invested millions in the 
country and is securing a big return. Before the floods 
and strikes of the summer of 1954, each week the United Fruit 
Company was shipping 225,000 stems of bananas to the United 
States. These bananas would be valued at around $1 .4 million 
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per week. 1 
It appears significant that the suit brought against 
the United Fruit Company in which it is charged to be a 
monopoly, came on the heels of the Guatemalan Revolution of 
June, 1954. A very interesting comment upon the political 
implications of this suit is reported in the July, 1954, 
issue of Busine~ Week. 
For the United States Government, the suit offers 
a disclaimer of Latin American charges that Washing-
ton backstopped the Guatemalan revolution in order 
to save Unifruitco, hard-pressed by the Communists 
there. The State Department and the antitrusters in 
Justice insist the suit is 'sheer coincidence,' a 
long time brewing. But it's no secret that State 
officials hope the suit will convince at least some 
Latin Americans t hat concern for the fruit company 
isn't the only determinant of our policies in Middle 
America. Privately, government people feel that 
U. s. economic and political relations, as well as 
u. S. business interests, will be better served if 
t he suit results in more companies and more competi-
tion in the banana trade. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The uit has given the appearance of u. s. sanc-
tion to Gommunist and nationalist charges that the 
United Fruit Company is a grasping Yankee monopoly.2 
A breakup of the firm asked by Justice Department 
antitrusters would have i mportant effects on the four 
Central American countries in which it operates, in-
deed throughout the whole area. There are political 
implications too--for Unifruitco is a prime focus of 
l"Banana Battle in Honduras," Business N'eelf, (May 22, 
1954)' 166. 
211 0il on Fire," Busine§..§. Week, (July 10, 1954), 128. 
ps 
anti-Yankee and Communist sentiment.l 
In the Annual Report for the year 1954, President 
Kenneth H. Redmond of the United Fruit Company recognizes 
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the problem which this suit has brought and as a consequence, 
some caution is displayed in regard to further investments 
in Latin America. Yet, he appears to feel that the suit 
will fail. A pertinent part of his report is here given. 
The complaint attacks the extent of the Company's 
plantations, wharves, railways, and other properties 
and operations in Latin America, alleging that by 
virtue of its large production and i mportation the 
Company monopolized the banana trade. Since the 
Company is under attack because of the extent of its 
developments in Latin America, prudence requires 
that the Directors of the Company give very careful 
consideration to the investment of the stockholders' 
money in the further expansion of banana production 
in the tropics until the legality of the Company's 
present situation has been established beyond doubt. 
The trial of the lawsuit by a small group of 
stockholders of the International Railways of Central 
American continued intermittently during 1954 and is 
currently in progress. Counsel remain of the opinion 
that the suit is without merit and expect that a 
decision in this case will be handed down in 1955.2 
Samuel Zemurray, who is now chairman of the Executive 
Committee of United Fruit, gives a defense of the size of 
his corporation in the January, 1945 issue of the Atlant!c 
~ill· 
lttMore Than Bananas and a Canal,' Business Week, 
(July 17, 1954), 116-118. 
2Annual Report for the Year 1954, ~·£it., p. 6. 
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On the afternoon of June 2, 1944, a rising wind 
blew in from the Pacific over the west coast of 
Guatemala. As it mounted to gale proportions, 
banana Plants loosely rooted in rain-sodden soil 
started to fall. The top-heavy weight of hundred 
pound stems of bananas pushed against the nearest 
plants, and these fell in turn, pushing against 
the next row. So, like collapsing cards, the plants 
went down. After one afternoon and night of such 
wind, we surveyed the damage at our Tiquisate divi-
sion. Nearly a million and a half 'available' 
banana Plants (those with fruit at or nearing the 
harvest) were destroyed. Another 2.3 million, not 
yet 'available,• were down. Strewn like green 
straws over 18,000 acres of plantation lay a total 
of 3.7 million plants, either bearing or soon to 
bear a valuable food product. 
Unusual? Not at all. Banana cultivation not 
only faces natural enemies such as wilt, but is 
subject to all the hazards of agriculture. Drought, 
flood, hurricane, or even a fairly high wind can 
wipe out whole sections, as I have just related, 
while plantations elsewhere go unscathed. So far 
it ha·s never happened that all our crops have been 
destroyed in any one year. 
I mention this because it has a bearing on the 
size of companies engaged in the banana industry of 
Uiddle America. Limited to a single division such 
as Tiquisate, a producer would be wiped out by a 
blowdown like that of June 2. If disaster came to 
one production region, there must be others to make 
up the deficiency. If ships cannot load in one 
country or can obtain but a partial cargo, there 
must be others where they can load or fill out the 
cargo in order to maintain the economic flow of 
supplies. 
Our fruit is consumed in the United States, 
Canada, the British Isles, and normally in conti-
nental Europe, as well as in the Middle and South 
America. Transportation to a world market of a 
tropical food product such as bananas re uires a 
fleet of fast, specially designed, refrigerated 
ships. Distributing this fruit calls for an organi-
•zation that can handle a perishable commodity in 
any kind of weather. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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Modern tropical agriculture is a major under-
taking. To conduct it on a scale adequate to 
grow and transport food products to great markets, 
to pay good wages, to banish deadly human disease, 
to conduct research in the never ending war against 
plant enemies, to carve new land from jungles and 
swamps, to develop new crops for the betterment of 
farmers big and small, requires sizable enterprise.l 
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Among Washington officials, the concensus seems to 
be that the United Fruit Company will not be forced to give 
up any portion of its banana business. nyou have to be 
big, well-integrated, and well-heeled to ride the bumps."2 
V. THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY AS A BUILDER OF CIVILIZATION 
The chief aim of the United Fruit Company is to earn 
a pr ofit for its stockholders. Nevertheless, in many fields 
of endeavor, civilization, as it is known in the North 
American sense, has been greatly advanced in Central America 
through the efforts put forth by this giant fruit company. 
Ho:n~itals .aM Medical Work. The United Fruit Company 
early recognized that a healthy employee was an asset. There-
fore, it was in the Company's interest to establish a medical 
system that has come to be one of the great tropical programs 
of the world. Today, the United Fruit Company has in the 
lsamuel Zemurray and John Terry, nNew Crops for the 
New World,n A.il.§.ntic Monthl,y, CLXXV (January, 1945), 101-102. 
2 11 More Than Bananas and a Canal,u .QQ• cit., p. 118. 
p:z 
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tropics fifteen major hospitals and over a hundred outlying 
dispensaries . Scores of sanitation squads and traveling 
nurses are combating all types of tropical diseases, and 
setting health standards that would profit all Latin Amer-
ica to follow . These hospitals are not only for the employ-
ees of the United Fruit Company, but for their fami l ies and 
other nationals that live in the area . l 
The hospitals established by the United Fruit Com-
pany at La Lima in Honduras may be taken as an example of 
what is being done in the medical field. 
At La Lima, the hospital was first built in 1921, 
but the original structure was replaced by a modern one in 
1951. The new hospital is a fireproof structure of concrete 
block with a stucco facing. It is located in the center of 
the Company operations, and the land about it is attrac-
tively landscaped . Dr . Rafael Martinez, a citizen of 
Honduras and a member of several me dical associations (includ-
ing the American Society of Tropical Medicine), is in cl~rge 
of the hospital . 2 
With a capacityfur three hundred bed patients, the 
hospital is staffed by approximately three hundred, including 
l~ckgrourua Qa.1a on United Fruit Company in Middle 
America New York: United Fruit Company), p. 4. 
2Sidney Wallach, Honduran Hosyitals Serve Their 
QQmmunitie§ (New York: United Fruit Company), p. 2. 
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nineteen staff doctors, six interns, fifteen North American 
nurses and some twenty-four graduate Latin American nurses. 
The staff includes dietitians, laboratory and x-ray tech-
nicians and attendants, cooks, laundry employees, gardeners, 
and others. Also, the hospital operates an outpatient 
department which serves about 350 patients a day.l 
The hospital statistics are impressive. During the 
year 1951, the latest year for which figures are available, 
the hospital treated 9,481 bed patients. Of this total only 
3,705 were employees of the United Fruit Company. Dispensary 
patients for the same year came to 92,776 employees, plus 
125,882 employee dependents and others outside the Company 
organization. Also in 1951, the surgical department pro-
vided 334 major and 5,340 minor operations. Total hospital 
days amounted to 57,630.2 
In its malaria control program, 16,412 examinations 
were made. In the preceding year, 23,069 persons were 
vaccinated. Plans are being developed to advance the health 
standards in the country as a whole. Comprehensive health 
services are contemplated with a view to early detection 
and care in disease.3 
Programs such as this are being carried out in 
fifteen medical centers of the Caribbean sector. Dr. Edward 
... 
Salisbury, head of the medical department of the United 
Fruit Company, sums up the program by stating: 
The United Fruit Company is justly proud of its 
medical and sanitary programs and feels that its 
survival for fifty years is proof that the physical 
and moral welfare of the worker is not an imponder-
able asset; rather, it is one which tips the balance 
toward successful business and builds new economii 
structures in the countries in which it operates . 
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The medical program of the United Fruit Company has 
not been free from criticism. It has been charged that, 
while it is true that the employees of the Company receive 
free medical care in the hospitals, it is also a fact that 
a definite race prejudice exists . It has been stated that 
native Central Americans are usually treated in wards, 
whereas Americans are placed in private rooms. Should an 
American need treatment that the hospital cannot give, then 
he is sent to the United States for the necessary care. A 
national is not given the privilege of treatment in a 
United States hospital, even when it may be necessary from 
the medical standpoint.2 This point of distinction has been 
a constant source of friction. 
l.nu.g . ' p . 4 . 
2nuring a personal interview with an individual who 
has held a responsible position with United Fruit for four-
teen years, this practice was declared to be existent. The 
name of the witness is withheld to protect his present 
position. 
jSiS 
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Schools. In each of the countries where the United 
Fruit Company has an established organization, it has a 
wholly-supported school system. The teachers are mostly 
nationals and are paid directly by the Company. The 
curricula in each area are in strict accordance with national 
policy. Thousands of children reap the benefits of this 
schooling.1 On the whole the school system of the United 
Fruit Company appears to be quite well accepted, for the 
Government schools are quite inadequate. 
Radio. Early in the history of the United Fruit 
Company the necessity for wireless communication was noted, 
and as a consequence, radio communications were soon estab-
lished. This radio network was used to coordinate tropical 
harvests with ship movements and the needs of the northern 
markets. As was true in the case of the hospitals, this 
service soon came to be a servant of the public. Today 
this radio network is known as the Tropical Radio Tele-
graph Company and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the United 
Fruit Company. It not only serves the interests of the 
parent organization, but affords a highly efficient radio-
telephone and radiotelegraph service for all Middle America. 
Another service that recently has been added provides the 
modern teleprinter service.2 
1Backgroun9 Qaia, Q~· cit., p. 7. 2Ibiq., pp. 4, 5. 
.. 
------------
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Passenger £nd Freigh! Service. The Great White Fleet 
of the United Fruit Company was obviously created to serve 
the interests of the fruit industry, but it too has devel-
oped into a vital service for the people of Central America. 
These vessels have moved to the Caribbean area countless 
tons of manufactured products , and at the same time, they 
have provided first class accommodations for an ever in-
creasing number of tourists. During 1954, the ships of 
the United Fruit Company carried 1,453,486 tons of cargo 
to Middle America. In the same year, the ships carried 
15,3 51 passengers to and from the same area. Needless to 
say, the Great White Fleet has made a tremendous contribu-
tion to the economy of Central America.1 
A Promoter of Tropical Agricultu~. One often 
thinks of the United Fruit Company as a producer anddis-
tributor of only bananas, but this is far from being correct 
even though the banana is the only fruit that is sold 
through its organization. In 1954, the Company had 603,111 
acres of land for its use in its entire field of operation. 
For the production of bananas, only 136,220 acres were used. 
The remainder of the acreage was used as follows: sugar 
cane, 99,313 acres (all in Cuba and Jamaica); cacao, 34,745 
l[Um.lli\l Reporj; for the llil: ~' .Q.TI• cit., p. 1. 
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acres; abaca, 20,553 acres; oil palm, 19,745 acres; and 
other crops, 292,535 acres.l Three of the crops mentioned 
have been first produced and developed on a commercial scale 
by the United Fruit Company in Central America. 
In 1942, when the Japanese had blocked off from the 
Allies all sources of ~funila hemp, the United Fruit Com-
pany was able to provide from its experimental farms the 
seeds to start Plantations for the propagation of the plants 
that produce this vital fiber, from which rope and other 
cordage is manufactured. Within two years, 28,000 acres of 
abaca, from which Manila hemp is made, were flourishing in 
Middle America. This project was conducted by the United 
States Government, but under the management of the United 
Fruit Company. For the first seven years of the project, 
the Company made its land and facilities available without 
charge. Since 1949, the projec~have continued, largely in 
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala, and the Company receives 
from the American government a nominal management fee for its 
services:.2 
In more recent years, the Company has been able to 
extensively develop the African oil palm. Under Company 
direction and development, palm oil today is furnishing the 
libid., p. 11. 
2Backgroung ~~' ~· ~., p. 6. 
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resident of Central America with a superior grade of vega-
table oil for cooking and for the manufacture of soap. The 
greater portion of these Palms are found in Costa Rica and 
Honduras.1 
Another crop that is becoming an important factor in 
Middle American economy is cacao, the plant from which 
chocolate is made. It has passed the experimental stage and 
is becoming a basic crop. About 28,000 acres of cacao are 
to be found in Costa Rica.2 
Diversification of Qr9~g. It has been to the Com-
pany's advantage to have more than one crop in Central 
America. Bananas are too often subject to storm, floods, 
diseases, and other disasters. For example, in the past 
when Panama disease would infest one of the plantations, 
the Company would tear up its railroads and move out, 
abandoning the fertile land that had been cleared from the 
jungles. Frequently, when the Company moved out the people 
followed. However, at the present time new and diversified 
crops are being planted on the same land. Many times the 
land is eventually turned over to the natives after they 
have been taught to utilize it in the production of the new 
llbid.' p. 6. 
2Annual Report ill the ~.a.J: l.2,2, .Q.:Q. cit., p. 11. 
p:z 
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crops. The natives in turn can sell the products to the 
Company. Abaca, cacao, and oil palm are the major crops 
that have thus been introduced.! 
It is worth noting that these new crops that are being 
introduced to Central America are not in any way suited to 
the climate of the United States or Canada and therefore are 
not competing with any of our North American agricultural 
products. The United Fruit Company is of the opinion that 
diversified crop production is a partial solution to the 
Central American economy. Sam Zemurray explained the 
United's position as follows: 
In 1942 the directors of the United Fruit Com-
pany adopted a statement of policy which gave 
formal expression to the program of utilizing the 
company organization and tropical resources to 
assist the native population in growing diversi-
fied food products 'without expectation other than 
good will from friendly neighbors' in the interest 
of a balanced Middle American economy based on a 
contented, prosperous agricultural population.2 
The Pan American School of Agricul~~~.3 In 1941, 
the United Fruit Company established the Pan American School 
of Agriculture on the Hacienda El Zamorano, located about 
twenty-five miles southeast of Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The 
lzemurray, ~· cit., p. 102. 
2Ibid., p. 102. 
3Escuela Agrico~ Esnamericana, (Boston: United Fruit 
Company). 
ps 
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property of the school contains over 3500 acres, of which 
about 1000 acres are arable. The Honduras Government was 
paid about $35,000 for the land, and with the buildings and 
improvements, the school now represents an investment of 
about a million dollars. The cost of operating the school is 
at present estimated at about $225,000 per year. 
The boys who attend the school may come from any one 
of the Middle or South American Republics. Entrance is 
based upon competitive tests that are given to the 300 to 
500 that apply each year. The school is in no sense a 
training ground for Company employees. Each student is 
expected to return to his own town or village, where he is 
well qualified to raise the standard of living in his com-
munity. 
This free three-year course deals with all phases 
of tropical agriculture--with one exception. It does not 
teach the cultivation of the banana. The studies are inten-
sive and deal with subjects such as dairying, butchering, 
tree grafting, and the production of all sorts of tropical 
products that can be grown in Middle America. Many of the 
graduates go into government service; others become teach-
ers or go into agricultural extension work; still others, 
who are very well qualified are sent to the United States on 
scholarships for further training. 
The "Es cuela Agricola Panamericana 11 (Pan-American 
.... 
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School of Agriculture) is perhaps one of the greatest good-
will builders that the United Fruit Company operates in 
Central America. 
Contribution to Middle American Economx. The influ-
ence of t he United Fruit Company is perhaps noted in the 
direct financial contribution that it has made to the 
countries in which it operates. Given in Table I is a de-
tailed account of how the United Fruit Company has contri-
buted to the economy of Middle America. These statistics 
include some countries that are not in Central America. 
Data relating only to t he Central American countries wre·re 
not made available to the author. 
VI. NEW CONTRACTS RECE NTLY ARRANGED WITH 
COSTA RICA AND GUATEMA LA 
Time Magazine in the issue of June 7, 1954, reports 
the new contract that was drawn up between the United Fruit 
Company and Costa Rica: 
Terms: The Company will pay a 30% income tax 
(twice the current rate), surrender its present 
exemption from customs duties on about half of its 
supply imports, and turn over to t he state its 70 
hospitals, schools, and other social service cen-
ters, with the state to support them in the future. 
President Jose Figueres, well pleased, calculates 
that the government will get 42% of t he company•s 
profits under the new deal. Central Americans now 
feel tha t the company may offer much the same terms 
to Honduras ••• and Guatemala.1 
1 11 Bright Spot in Coata Rica,rr Time, LXIII (June 7, 
1954)' 41. 
p:s 
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TABLE I 
THE CON1'RIBUTION OF THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY TO NATIONAL 
ECONOMIES OF C OLUUBIA , COSTA RICA, CUBA , D OI,'iiNICAN 
REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATE1~LA, HONDURAS, 
JA~.:AICA, NICARAGUA .1: PANAI1.A FOR 
YEAR 1953 
Paig to Governm~nts 
Income Taxes • • • • • • • • • • • 
Export Duties • • • • • • • • • • 
Import Duties • • • • • • • • • • 
Other Federal Taxes • • • • • • • 
unicipal Taxes • • • • • • • • • 
Total Paid Governments • • • • 
~ to Individuals 
Pay Rolls • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Merchandise Local Purchases ••• 
Material Local Purchases ••••• 
Rental Paid • • • • • • • • • • • 
Ice, Fuel and Power Purchased •• 
Transportation--Railway ••••• 
Transportation--Air ••••••• 
Transportation--Other •••••• 
Bulls Hauling Cane • • • • • • • • 
Sugar Cane Purchased • • • • • • • 
Cacao Purchased • • • • • • • • • 
Abaca Purchased • • • • • • • • • 
Rice Purchased • • • • • • • • • • 
Corozo Nut s Purchased • • • • • • 
Oil Palm Purchased • • • • • • • • 
Bananas Purchased • • • • • • • • 
Total Paid Individuals • • • • 
GRAND TOTAL 
$ 8,170,886.36 
1,033,569.94 
2,637,926.95 
5' 545,637.96 
439,370.40 
$ 17,827,391.61 
$ 73,286,706.64 
11,209,889.61 
8,298,435.83 
404,752.67 
264,111.59 
3,046,811.97 
217,370.36 
122,423.-59 
91,083.62 
1,268,133.24 
199,711.79 
12,039.10 
129,084.14 
16,428.71 
30,162.08 
6,779,158.92 
$105 ,376,303.86 
$123,203,695.47 
*Taken from, ~ground~' ..QJ2• cit., p. 10. 
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]Ysine~ ~ek, in the edition of January 1, 1955, 
gives a similar review for the agreement that later was 
made with Guatemala. 
United Fruit Company, sorely pressed during 1954 
by Reds and revolutions, anti-trust proceedings, 
and expropriation, signed its new contract this week . 
All seemed sweetness and light between the big 
banana company and the revolutionary government in 
Guatemala City. 
President Carlos Castillo Armas' regime gets 30% 
of the company's yearly profits in taxes, retroactive 
to January 1, 1954 (about $700,000) . 
The Guatemalans have agreed to return all lands 
expropriated, and to abandon proceedings for taking 
over further acreage (the total involved was close 
to 400,000 acr es). For its part, Unifruitco will 
turn over to the government upwards of 100,000 acres 
in the Tiquisate area of the West Coast. For the 
future, the company plans to concentrate on new 
developments1in the east, in the Atlantic province of Bananera. 
In the Annual Report for the Year 1954, the Presi -
dent of the United Fruit Company stated: 
The government of Honduras has been advised that 
the Company is willing to renegotiate its contract 
with the country along the lines of the new contracts 
that have been signed with other countries, and it 
is expected th~t negotiations on this matter will 
begin in 1955 . .... 
President Redmond of United Fruit further stated: 
All the major problems which the Company has had 
to meet in recent years in various Latin American 
l"New Deal in Guatemala," Business Week, (January 1, 
1955)' 53. 
2Anny§.l ~nort for lli Year l.2.21, 212· cit., p. 5. 
.... 
countries where it operates have been satisfactor-
ily settled . The Company ' s relations with the 
governments and peoples of these countries are 
excellent and the Company l ooks forward to a period 
of favorable operating conditions in all of these 
countries . l 
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An examination of sentiment in Central America indi-
cates t hat this statement is somewhat optimistic. 
The reader can secure a bri ef estimate of the economic 
status of the United Fruit Company and its operations by 
giving careful attention to Tables II, III, and IV . All of 
t hese statistics are taken directly from the Annual Report 
for 1hg Year 1221· It is to be noted that t he earnings of 
the Company dropped in the year 1954 as compared to the 
year 1953. In the Annual Report t his is explained as 
resulting from de nressed market conditions in the raw sugar 
industry, and unfavorable conditions in Honduras . During 
1954 Honduras suffered from hurricanes, devastating floods, 
and a general strike that lasted some ten weeks. As a con-
sequence shipments from that country decreased from 8,5oo, 
000 stems in 1953 to 4 ,8oo,ooo stems in 1954 . Otherwise, 
these statistics present a gener ally ·fair appra i · abf the 
assets of the United Fruit Company. 
. libid . 
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TABLE II 
THE ECONOMIC STORY IN BRIEF FOR THE YEAR 1954 FOR 
THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY 
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Year En<Wd 
December 31, 1954 
Per Share Amount 
Net earnings • • $3.58 $31 ,459,780 
Dividends declared $3.00 $26,324,991 
Retained in the 
business • • • $ .58 $ 5,l!4,789 
Number of stockholders • • • 71,954 
Total number of shares out-
standing • • • • • • • • • 8, 775~000 
Number of Company-owned 
vessels (all fleets) • • • 64 
Nautical miles steamed •· •• 5,115,811 
Total freight movement, in 
tons (other than Company 
products) •••••••• 1,453,486 
Number of passengers carried 15,351 
Number of Company-owned 
radio stations (afloat and 
ashore). • • • • • • • • • 73 
Number of tropical employees 81,958 
Other employees • • • • • • 10,335 
Net investment in Europe • $23,682,603 
December 31' 1953. 
Per Share Amount 
$5.07 $44 '556 ,464 
$3.50 $30,712,489 
$1.57 $13,843,775 
68,463 
8,775,000 
65 
5,082 '502 
1,653,400 
15,909 
74 
96,353 
10,302 
$21,675,409 
..... 
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TABLE III 
FIXED ASSETS OF THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY 
AND SUBSIDIARIES 
Accumulated 
Inves tmg,y.:t, Depreciation Book YsllY&t 
Lands $27,723,868 $11,8 52' 746 $15,871,122 
Houses and buildings 60,254,930 30,996,811 29,258,119 
Cultivation 89,249,187 38,598,282 50,650 '905 
Equipment 84,049,788 41,702,723 42,347,065 
Railways and tramwaysa 57,150,171 27,110,376 30,039,795 
Wharves, boats, etc. 4,983,263 2,957,932 2,025,331 
Sugar mills and ref in-
eriesb 22,701,455 15,864,384 6,837,071 
Steamships 92,771,997 44,911,112 47,860,885 
Livestockc 4,131,378 
TOTAL $443,016,037 $213 '994 '366 $229,021,671 
aincludes roadway, track, and rolling stock. 
bincludes buildings and equipment. 
ccattle ••••• 
Horses and mules 
Other animals. • 
Total 
50,980 
17' 552 
122 
68,654 
TABLE IV 
IMPROVED ACREAGE AND RAILWAYS OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY 
Sugar 
Bananas cane QgQg,Q Abaca Qil Palm Other Total Rai1wa~s Trsm:w:ays ( ileage) (Mileage) 
Columbia 6,819 500 9,296 16,615 15.83 1.08 
Costa Rica 37,347 27,017 8,218 9,837 30,968 113,386 323.31 85.57 
Cuba 95,040 59,056 154,096 329.07 
Dominican 
Republic 4,183 6,484 10,667 34.80 
Ecuador 7,823 4,645 5,743 18,211 51.88 
Guatemala 19' 554 4,903 1,351 49,581 75,389 176.55 43.14 
Honduras 26,179 5,096 5,164 83,496 119,935 395.39 4.69 
Jamaica 1,632 4,273 910 6,815 22.81 
Panama 24,916 3,083 2,336 1, 504 34' 516 66,355 194.92 7.90 
Other 7,767 1,389 12,485 21,641 64.21 
TOTAL 136,220 99,313 34 '745 20,553 19,745 292 '535 603,111 1,492.68 258.47 
.... 
CHAPTER IV 
REACTIONS TO AMERICAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
INFLUENCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Has the United States been imperialistic in Central 
America? Has the presence of the United Fruit Company in 
Middle America had an adverse effect upon the native popu-
lation? Central Americans have attempted to answer these 
and many other related questions. The answers that they 
have given do not reflect unanimity, but nevertheless they 
have greatly influenced the contemporary Central American's 
opinion of the Yankee. This chapter has placed a major 
emphasis upon native reaction to American political and 
economic influences in Central America. An understanding 
of this reaction will facilitate the reader in securing a 
wider grasp of the problems that await a solution. 
I. GENERAL REACTIONS TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
The first major proclamation that officially expressed 
the United States' policy toward Latin America became notable 
in that sector for its lack of an understanding of the Span-
ish American temperament. President Monroe proclaimed the 
doctrine that later came to be called by his name in the 
same year that Central America achieved independence from 
Spain (1823). Central America, as well as the other Latin 
.. 
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American nations, had greatly admired the step that the 
United States had taken in securing independence from a 
European power. Even though they did not have to fight for 
freedom, still the Central Americans were very proud of the 
fact that they too had become an independent nation as had 
the United States. True, their government was very unstable 
and very much in the experimental stage, but nevertheless 
the Central Americans considered themselves to be sovereign. 
However, at the very time that they were beginning to recog-
nize the possibilities inherent in an independent status, 
the Monroe Doctrine was announced by the United States. 
Ma ny felt that the Monroe Doctrine was designed to prohibit 
the entrance of European powers into Latin America so that 
the United States might have a free hand. The motive of 
the United States may have been well understood by the North 
American people, but in Latin America a negative reaction 
became evident. 
Perhaps the basic reason for Central Americans' dis-
like of the Monroe Doctrine was that it was unilateral. The 
Latin Americans have a great regard for the personal dignidad 
or dignity of the individual. At the same time they love 
discussion. Before any matter of i mportance is undertaken, 
they sit down and discuss that situation at great length. 
If this is not done, the dignidad of the individual or 
individuals may be deeply offended. In this respect the 
.. 
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Monroe Doctrine in no way mentioned the possibility of the 
United States discussing any situation with the Latin 
American nations . The Doctrine simply declared that the 
United States would do thus and so if the European powers 
acted in certain ways . The nations whose destinies were 
involved were not to be consulted . This was an insult to 
Latin American dignity. 
Another failure to recognize the dignity of the 
nations involved is seen in the fact that the United States 
had taken upon herself the role of the protector of the 
Western Hemisphere . The Latin American nations were young 
and very sensitive about their power (or lack of it). With 
the proclamation of the ~onroe Doctrine, in their opinion 
the United States was saying, nLatin America is not capable 
of protecting itself, therefore, the United States will 
take up the task of becoming the protector of the Western 
Hemisphere . " This supposed attitude was resented (as un-
complimentary) by the newly independent nations to the south 
of the Rio Grande River . 
With national feelings thus injured, the people of 
----~t~he-Latin American area were unable to see the benevolent 
aspects involved . They thus began to look for other motives, 
and as a result, "the southern neighbors were led to believe 
that the Monroe Doctrine was only an instrument to fence off 
the imperialism of Europe from regions which the United 
... 
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States intended to appropriate for itself.ul 
This dislike and distrust for the Monroe Doctrine was 
made manifest on many occasions during .the American diplo-
matic relations with Latin America and especially in the 
Caribbean sector. This distrust was prominent with respect 
to President Theodore Roosevelt's famous "Corollaryn to the 
Monroe Doctrine. The objection to it was that it also was 
unilateral, not inter-American. While it prohibited Euro-
pean intervention in Latin America, it claimed for the United 
States the right to intervene in situations when in its 
opinion "chron:c wrong-doing" made intervention a necessity. 
Roosevelt 's Co ollary ushered in a quarter century of 
"benevolent imperialism." However, the Latin Americans 
tended to see the imperialism rather than the benevolence. 2 
The role of protector or big-brother is never a 
popular one. Basically, the protector is saying "I am 
stronger than you. You are weaker than I. Therefore, I 
will protect you." The ones that are being shown such 
kindness are made to feel inferior. No one likes to be 
made to feel inferior. This is doubly true of Latin Americans, 
lsamuel Flagg Bemis , The Latin American Po1icz of the 
YnitBd States~ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), 
p. 3 5. 
2Arthur P. •!hitaker, ttThe United States in Latin 
America Since 1865," Current History, XXVIII (March, 1955), 
155. 
ps 
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for they are noted for their personal pride . The United 
States has striven to preserve peace in the Caribbean area, 
has attempted to keep footholds from being secured by foreign 
powers and has sought to teach them a democratic_ way of life--
but all with a rather paternalistic attitude . 
In commenting upon American imperialism in the Carib-
bean area in the 1920 ' s, the Nation describes the general 
attitude of the Americans as thus: " le are in the Caribbean 
for the moral and physical welfare of 'our wards'; we are 
there to teach them how to govern themselves with excellence 
and efficiency, and we are doing it for their ultimate good."l 
By means of formal and informal interviews with 
natives of Central America, some of whom are high in their 
political positions, the author has been able to secure many 
and varied opinions concerning the theme before us . A 
typical reaction was secured from one of the Honduran consuls, 
who workd with~ ~rtamento de B~~acciones Exteriores, 
which is the State Department of Honduras . He clearly de-
clared, 
hy it is that most all of the past intervention 
of the United States Government was found among the 
smallest countries? Of course we cannot fight 
against the United States, we know it, and the United 
States ~lso knows it . Do they pick on us because we 
are so s mall? How many times have American marines 
l"Our Caribbean Imperialism,n T]J.e Nation, CX 
(February 21, 1920), 226. 
.. 
been l anded in Brazil or Argentina? They have 
had revolutions and very unstable governments, but 
the United States has not intervened to bring them 
a so-called peace. Our little nations here in 
Central America are small, but they also are inde-
pendent . We don't like to be bossed by the United 
States just because we are small . l 
This declaration does not take into consideration 
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the geographical location of the various nations involved 
in respect to the United States and the Panama Canal, but 
nevertheless it does definitely reflect the attitude that 
Yankee intervention has been a source of difficulty and 
hard feelings . 
Another typical Central American reaction to the 
Yankee intervention that immediately followed the First 
orld War was given by a Latin American, Dr . Joseph IY:L . de 
los Reyes, on July 1, 1949, before the Institute of World 
Affairs, held at Los Angeles, California. 
We sent our Marines to Haiti and Nicaragua, and 
exacted payment of debts from the Latin-American 
countries, while we forgave the billions that 
Europe owed us . 2 
This attitude has been so very difficult for our 
Central American friends to understand . They have not been 
able to comprehend why the United States has actually entered 
lstatement by a Honduran Consul, personal interview. 
2Joseph M. de los Reyes, "Latin American Dynamite 
and the Stupidity of U. S . Foreign Policy," Vi!al Speeches, 
XV (September 15, 1949), 727. 
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some of the small Caribbean nations, and administered their 
customs and finances, so that debts could be paid to foreign 
powers . Yet at the very same time the European powers who 
were being repaid the debts from Latin America owed the United 
States billions, and the American government was not using 
armed force to see that their own money be repaid . Once 
again the Central American has had the tendency to ask, 
"Are we being picked on because we are small and can't fight 
back?" 
Conceivably a basic difficulty could lie in the fact 
that the benevolent motive of American policy has never been 
appreciated . It may well be that intervention of the United 
States prevented similar action with much more drastic 
results by European powers . Such a possibility is a founda-
tion for misunderstanding . 
Dr . Joseph M. de los Reyes makes another very inter-
esting comment for one of Latin American extraction, when 
he speaks of certain phases of the Latin American policy of 
the New Deal. 
A gigantic w. P. A. was created; we began to buy, 
or at least attempt to buy, Latin American friend-
ship, not realising that the easiest way to lose a 
friend is to lend him so much money, he is unable to 
repay it . l 
This criticism may be somewhat unjustified, for many 
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of the Latin American nations, especially in Central America, 
are extremely poverty-stricken in regard to available cap-
ital, and foreign capital is being used to a wonderful advan-
tage. However, it is true that once again the inferiority 
of the Latin American is emphasized when it becomes neces-
sary for him to accept financial assistance from the United 
States. 
Inasmuch as the countries of the Caribbean are in 
such close proximity to the United States, there is a tend-
ency on the part of these nations to want to keep the good 
favors of the "Big-Brother . " They realize that at any time 
if the American government were to boycott them economicall~ 
or withhold political recognition from their countries, 
they would suffer tremendously . Therefore, whether 
they favor it or not, they want to keep in the good graces 
of the United States . It is perhaps for this reason that 
the United States minister in these countries has such a 
tremendous influence. 
Samuel Guy Inman, one who has spent much time in the 
region under discussion, states, 
In the Caribbean countries especiall y, the word 
of the American minister is the most important factor 
for any government to consider. It is i mpossible for 
anyone who has not come into close contacts with 
these countries to realize how completely their gov-
ernments are held in the hollow of the hand of the 
State Department at Washington.l 
lsamuel Guy Inman, "Imperia lis tic America," The 
Atlantic MonthlY, CXXXIV (July, 1924), 110. 
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A casual observer of the sit~ation might surmise 
that, as a result of Latin American resentment against the 
foreign policy of the United States our diplomatic program 
as a whole would be looked upon with disfavor. This is 
not entirely correct . 
The Latin Americans do consider t he North Americans 
to be Americans. In regard to tiemisphe~ matters, frequent-
ly, especially in past years, the foreign policy has been 
criticised, but this is a family matter. True, the uBig 
Brother" may not always be admired when he tries to boss 
the family, but when an outsider gets into a dispute with 
the 'tBig -Brother," the "Little-Brothersn are the first ones 
to come to help him as they can. History appears to indi-
cate that the Pan American nations often are disagreed at 
home on family matters, perhaps not so much officially as 
unofficially, but in a global or wor ld aspect, the majority 
of the countries of the New World can unite quite quickly 
when a crisis may arise that is mutual to all . 
A vivid example of this type of a situation was 
revealed at the start of the Second rorld War . 
The Republics of the New lorl d had said at 
Havana (1940) that any attempt against the terri-
tory or sovereignity of one of them should be con-
sidered as an act of aggression against all of 
them. How now would they react when Japan attacked 
the United States, and her allies Germany and Italy 
declared war on the United States? How would these 
nations which had been the scene of United States 
intervention respond when the Republic of the North 
met its time of trial? Would they welcome the 
discomfiture of the 'Colossus', whom they had 
regarded as the imperialistic power? Or would 
they feel that their independence and liberty 
were bound up with that of their 'alien' neigh-
bor and his Isthmanian life-line? 
The very countries who had been the 'victims' 
or closest witness of United States intervention 
or influence during the decade of protective 
imperialiam, namely Cuba, Panama, the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, licarague, Guatemala, Honduras, 
El Salvador, and Costa Rica, immediately and 
spontaneously declared war against the enemies of 
the United States.! 
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To summarize, the Latin Americans, including the Central 
Americans, do not wish to be dominated by anyone--for this 
cramps their spirit of individualism. They in no way wish 
to be made to feel inferior--for this hurts their pride and 
dignity. The United States, largely through ignorance of 
Latin American characteristics, has violated both of these 
principles, and as a result American foreign policy in the 
past has been a source of misunderstanding and difficulty. 
II. HAS THE UNITED STATES GOVERlm:ENT BEEN IMPERIALISTIC 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA? 
This problem is not at all new, but it still is very 
debatable. Many .times throughout the last one-half century, 
the United States has been declared an imperialistic nation. 
The time in whi.ch the debate perhaps was the most 
lBemis, ~· cit., pp. 372-373. 
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controversial was during the decade between 1920 and 1930. 
Whjle it is not the major purpose of this section to dis-
cuss public opinion in the United States on the subject, 
the reader will find it profitable to know some of the 
ideas that were being publicized. 
One leading American who fervently condemned the 
United States was Samuel Guy Inman. In the July, 1924 
issue of the AtlantiQ Monthly , he stated the following: 
In these smaller countries of the South, con-
trolled by our soldiers, our bankers, and our oil 
kings , we are developing our Irelands, our Egypts, 
and our Indias. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
We are piling up hatreds, suspicions, records 
for exploitation and destruction of sovereign~~ 
in La tin America, such as have never failed in all 
history to react in war, suffering, and defeat of 
high moral and spiritual ideals. How can the 
United States expect to be the exception to the 
rule? 
Run your eyes rapidly down the map and note the 
countries where the United States is now in prac-
tical control. And remember that this control 
always brings resentment and enmity among the people 
though their officials may approve of it. Here is 
the list: 
( Mr . Inman lists fourteen nations as having suffered 
the results of United States imperialism in Latin America. 
Here are listed only the Central American republics.) 
Nicaragua, where we have maintained one hundred 
marines since 1912, keeping in control a government 
which--according to the American Admiral in charge--
is opposed by eighty per cent of the Nicaraguans, 
but which is favorable to the American bankers, who, 
with the approval of the State Department, collect 
.... 
the customs and own the national bank and the 
railroad- - such a complete control that the 
country is known throughout Latin America by 
the name of the bankers who hold these privi-
leges . 
Honduras, where the American minister and two 
American corporations have long been the con-
trolling powers, and where recently marines have 
been landed for 'protection of American life and 
property•--the same formula under which they 
have entered and remained in other countries . 
Salvador , where a loan at eight per cent- -
plus extra charges--has recently been made by 
New York bankers, which loan is guaranteed by 
seventy per cent of the customs receipts , col-
lected by the bankers, with the agreement made 
by the Secretary of the United States that if any 
differences arise between Salvador and the bankers--
he, the Secretary of State--will refer the question 
to the Chief Justice of the United States, whose 
word shall be final. 
Guatemala, where American bankers control the 
business; American money is the medium of circula-
tion, and the United Fruit Company and other AmeriJ 
can financial interests have secured control of the 
railroads, which now become a part of the Interna-
tional Railways of Central America - -the largest 
American owned railway enterprise outside of the 
United States . 
Co~ Rica, where, after thirty years' peace, 
American oil and financial interests formented a 
revolution against a ref~rm government and at 
present largely control the economic life of the 
country , and often act as brokers for the country . l 
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Sumner Welles, also one who has spent several years 
in Latin America, gives rebuttal to Mr . Inman, and defends 
American policy for the same period in history. He states 
in part: 
lrnman, ~·£it., pp . 107-116 . 
After years of personal experience in Latin 
America, the author is not convinced that this 
belief ~that America is imperialistic) is shared 
by more than a small proportion of the inhabit-
ants of any of the republics on the Continent . 
Although mistakes undoubtedly have been com-
mitted, our record in general has been one with 
which an American citizen may well be content . 
It has revealed a consistent effort on our part 
to strengthen the constitutional and stable 
governments, to develop legitimate commercial re-
lations, and by demonstration and friendly advice, 
to further the settlement by peaceful methods of 
international disputes . 
The practical task confronting our government 
is therefore the following: our relations with 
all the neighboring republics should be those 
existing between free and independent nations; 
yet until certain of these countries have developed 
a firm tradition of orderly, constitutional govern-
ment, the United States must be prepared to step 
in and protect the lives and property of its citi-
zens should they at any time be in danger; and it 
must likewise be ready to assume the responsibility 
of offering its friendly mediation, or in extreme 
cases, its friendly intervention, should condi-
tions be such as to threaten a national or an inter-
national conflagration which would give rise to a 
situation wherein the policy of self-protection of 
the United States, known as the onroe Doctrine, 
might be endangered . 
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The series of revolutions existing in Central 
America during the past century has forced the United 
States repeatedly to intervene temporarily in those 
republics in order to protect the lives and property 
of its own nationals, and in certain instances, those 
of other foreigners . 
It has been the studied policy of the United States 
in recent years to cooperate with the Governments of 
Central America in preventing these causes of chronic 
disturbances . l 
lsumner Telles, "Is America Imperialistic? 11 Atlantic 
MonthlY, CX..'CX IV (September, 1924), 414-423. 
'Our government has no intrigues, no secret 
agreements, no hidden policies . And when history 
fully reveals our relations at this time to our 
sister republics of this hemisphere, when corres-
pondence and instructions are published, I am 
happy to say that there will b.e no page of which 
any American need be a shamed. 1 l. 
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The Independent has stated in part concerning imperi-
alism in Central America: 
Whenever Washington finds i t necessary to send 
Marines into one or another of the Caribbean 
countries, cries of 'Imperialism1' fill the air . 
There are the native politicians whose activi-
ties have been limited by the landing of the Marines. 
They see the hated 'Norteamericanos, well-armed, 
well disciplined, and disconcertingly efficient, 
landing on the shores of their devoted country, 
taking full charge wherever they go, disarming na-
tive rioters, putting things in their place, and 
quieting the fears of the populace . These things 
are to the local politician quite obviously in-
fringements on the sovereignity of his republic and 
constitute 'militaristic intervention' by the 
'Colossus of the North' • 1 
But being a single-emotion man, he must forget 
the time a few years back, when his crowd held the 
offices and themselves called upon Uncle Sam to 
send Uarines to protect their country against 
revolution. That is just what his opponents are 
now doing . When his opponents do it, it becomes 
high treason and a true patriot must work himself 
into an agony of protest . 
If Uncle Sam were actuated by the agressive 
motives which his critics ascribe to him, there is 
no reason on earth why he should not long since 
have set his southern boundaries along the Panama 
Canal, or even further south . There is no power 
which could stop hi n if that were his will. 
lcharles Evans Hughes, as cited by Welles, Ibid. 
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The seeker of facts in the Caribbean countries 
finds no evidence there of Wall Street's financial 
domination . Their people want, not less money 
and less econom~- c development, but more . Never a 
voice is raised against American finance . The 
complaint against American interference is clos ely 
confined to the politicians, and their objection 
is not to American money , but to American restric-
tion of their nefarious activities. 
Another vigorous and unrestrained domestic 
voice in the chorus of ' imperialism• is the opposi-
tion press . Whatever, the true character of our 
policy toward these minor republics, it has been 
as consistently followed by the Democrats as the 
Republicans, and the parties must share the credit 
or blame for its results . 
No one of them has yet reached the degree of 
political development where a republican govern-
ment can be maintained against internal or external 
foes without assistance . Of their people all but 
a small minority--varying in the different coun-
tries--are illiterate and politically incompetent . 
The only governmental tradition is that inherited 
from the Spanish colonial days when public office 
was a private gold mine . Independence has yet 
brought neither a new tradition, a new experience, 
nor a new training . All of these decades may well 
be lengthened into centuries if the exploiting 
elements among the native population are allowed 
too free a hand . 1 
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Samuel Crowther was not satisfied with the opinion 
of the Americans on the subject of imperialism, so he went 
directly to Central America . The results of his findings 
were published in the February, 1928 issue of !orld's Work . 
Here he is quoted in part: 
I set out to find the American i mperialistic 
eagle. :My search ranged pretty much all over 
lHenry Kittredge Norton, nThe False Cry of Imperial-
ism," Indepe.ngent, CXVIII (March 19, 1927), 306-307 . 
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Central America . Though I heard that the bird 
had been seen, it was always in the next country. 
And when I came to that country, I found that it 
had not been there but was ouite likely in some 
other country . Thinking that if any one had first-
hand knowledge it would certainly be the presidents 
of these republics , I saw and talked vri th all of 
them . Here is what I saw and what they said . l 
Costa Rica, President Don RicardQ Jimenez: 
'There are no American concessions or monopolies, 
and as long as I have known the affairs of my 
country, which is a very long time, Americans have 
never mixed in politics, or had candidates or 
sought to influence elections, or attempted to 
exercise any influence outside their own business 
affairs . They have stood up for their rights, but 
they have asked no favors . They have received no 
favors, but I hope they have had their rights. 
' Vfuatever imperialism may be, it is not here. 
We do not know it and we never expect to know it.' 
Honduras, President Dr . t :igggl Paz .fu!r2hona: 
'Have the American companies or has the American 
Government done anything that could be classed as 
imperialistic? Have they interfered in any vmy 
with your own sovereignty?' I asked . 
'No, ' he answered, ' in no way. No American 
company has ever been in politics, and the few 
Americans that have eve n taken an active part in 
political affairs were acting for themselves: 
they were ' soldiers of fortune . ' They were 
members of their own parties and did not repre-
sent foreign interests . Whenever your government 
has landed marines it has been for the purpose 
of protecting property from useless destruction. 
We are not interfered with in any way, and I feel 
that the presence of the United States and the 
Monroe Doctrine, far from being a menace, consti-
tute our greatest protection. ' 
Nicaragua, President Diaz: 'The only solution 
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lsamuel Crowther, "Vlha t Imperialism Has Done in 
Central America," World 1 s Work, LV (February, 1928), 433 -
444. 
that will insure peace for Nicaragua , is an 
arrangement such as you have for Cuba under the 
Platt Amendment, which gives you the right to 
intervene in the case of revolution and also 
gives a certain supervision over finance . 
' There has never been any American imperial-
ism in Nicaragua . It is simply that we have been 
saved from the worst consequences of our purely 
sectional wars . 1 
Salvador , Dr . Egg Romero Bosggg : 'I have heard 
of imperialism, but I cannot say that I know ex-
actly what it means . Your countrymen have built 
our largest railroad, they have done the improve-
ment work here, they negotiated our loan, and our 
largest bank is owned by Americans . • • In fact, 
all our relations with Americans have been very 
pleasant, and I can see no reason why they should 
not continue so. We need you more than you need 
US • I 
Guatemala, President General Lazaro Chacon: 
'I have never heard of imperialism in this country . 
In fact, I do not know of any American company 
having asked for, or having received, anything to 
which it was not justly entitled . There are no 
American monopolies and we have been asked for 
none . All the best works we have are the result 
of American ca pital . ' 
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In making an analysis of the very favorable com-
ments t hat Mr . Crowther was able to receive from the presi-
dent of the five Central American republics, the reader 
should keep a few important factors in mind. The president 
is perhaps the best spokesman for the nation, but he does 
not s peak the mind of the entire nation . These presidents 
had their political opponents, who perha ps would not have 
endorsed the offical opinion of the Chief Executives . The 
anti-American demonstrations in Nicaragua dur ing the same 
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period, largely fostered by the Liberals, surely depicted 
an at t itude that would not have been in agreement with the 
words of President Diaz. 
One must also remember that some of these men quoted, 
notably Barahona of Honduras and Diaz of Nicaragua, had 
been able to maintain political order in their respective 
countries due to the presence or proximity of American 
marines. Had Nicaragua, for example, not been occupied at 
that very time by American marines, it is doubtful whether 
the government of Diaz would have been very stable. It 
appears obvious that some of these men did not want to be 
critical of the government that was assisting them to 
retain their own positions . 
These men knew that American approval or disapproval 
of their governments could mean their economic and politi-
cal disappearance or survival, so it is not surprising to 
hear them give favorable comments . ~ithin the character 
of the Latin American there also is to be found a deeply 
entrenched courtesy . This is to be admired by North 
Americans, who so many times lack it . However, as a result 
of this element, it is often difficult for a North American 
to secure response from a Latin American that would openly 
be critical of North American policy . Their courtesy tends 
to make it difficult to do so. Basically they r~y be 
critical and may not like a certain situation and feel it 
--
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very keenly, but to state the objectionable facts directly 
to the individual involved is another matter. 
Certainly if t he United States has been i mperial-
istic, it should be obvious t hat her imperialism was of a 
different nature than that of European nations. During the 
period when the "Spirit of Manifest Destiny" was such a 
powerful influence, there was talk of America extending her 
control over all of the North American continent. But the 
significant fact is that t he United States did not do it. 
At the end of the J.:exican War, and again in 1898, had the 
United States chosen to extend her boundaries down to the 
Isthmus of Panama, it is doubtful if any European power 
would have come to these nations' aid, and they were not 
capable of serious self-defense. Yet the United States 
refrained. European nations during this period were very 
active in securing colonies in Africa and in Asia. The 
results of their i mperialism remained with these countries 
until they were more or less forced to give some of them 
up, and they did so reluctantly. 
True, Cuba, the Philippines and other lands were oc-
cupiea, t ut eventually these areas were given their auton-
omy, and the United States was not forced to grant t heir 
freedom. The United States granted liberty when at peak 
power; it could have for s ome time easily retained control 
of whatever areas it chose. 
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The United States did land marines in different 
Central American countries on many occasions . In Nicaragua 
they remained for several years . But said interventions 
were, as noted earlier, usually carried out at the invita-
tion of the party in power . The marines remained at the 
request of the legal governments and it is significant to 
note that eventually they were all ~ithdrawn. 
American intervention did bring a semblance of politi-
cal stability to Central America . For example, Honduras has 
had 134 revolutions in its 130 year history, but since 1933 . 
there have been none . 1 That was the year American marines 
left Central America; if they had a part in bringing a 
greater degree of political order, then history may justify 
their usage . 
It is to be admitted that the methods used by the 
United States sometimes showed a dearth of understanding 
in regard to Latin American psychology, but history has 
shown the United States was not imperialistic for l ong . 
The mutual lack of understanding in respect to motives, both 
north and south of the Rio Grande, has produced m ch suspi-
cion and difficulty . The paternalistic or benevolent imperi-
alism if one may so call it, had a proper motivation, but 
l "Honduras Election," Time Magazine, LXIV (October 25, 
1954)' 33 . 
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was carried out without due regard to Latin American dig-
nity or psychology. The author is inclined to agree with 
the su~nation by Samuel Flagg Bemis: 
The southern nei ghbors were led to believe that 
the Honroe Doc trine was only an in strurnen t to fence 
off the imperialism of Europe from r egj ons hich 
the United States intended to appropriate fo~ itself. 
That the United States has been an imperialistic 
power since 1898 there is no doubt, although that 
comparatively mild imperialism was tapered off after 
1921 and is fully liquidated now. A careful con-
scientious appraisal of the United States shows, I 
am convinced, that it was never deep-rooted in the 
character of the people, that it was essentially a 
protective imperialism, designed to protect, first 
the security of the Continental Republic, next the 
security of the entire New ~orld, against interven-
tion by the imperiali stic powers of the Old lorld. 
It was, if you will, an imperialism against imperi-
a lis~. It did not a st long and it was not really 
bad. 
II. H VE RECE TT POLITICAL POLICI~S PRO TED ~· 10"\iE ACCEPTABLE? 
The v1i thdrav;al of American Marines from .,.icaragua in 
1933 marked the beginning of a new era of more favorable 
relations between the United States and all of Latin America. 
Shortly thereafter, Franklin D. Roosevelt developed his 
famed Latin American "Good eighbor Policy." This policy is 
in essence what the nited States still has today with per-
haps a few favorable additlons. Arthur P. thitaker has 
decla red that the Good ei gh or Policy has 1balled forth a 
lBemis, op . cit., pp . 385-86. 
135 
response of Latin American good-will unequaled in history."l 
.Dexter Perkins, who has delved deep into Latin Ameri-
can questions, strikes at the very root of the situation 
and reveals one reason why the recent policies of the United 
States have been more successful. 
Latin Americans do not wish to be dominated: 
they wish naturally enough, to play a part in the 
decisions on which common policy is to be based. 
Should we not, at least, give them an opportunity 
to do so in case any such problem arose? Would 
we not indeed be in a stronger position, if we 
acted under the pressure of a rising public opin-
ion throughout the Americas than if we acted alone.2 
The very essence of the Good Neighbor policy 
lies in the principle of consultation. The nations 
of the New ·~orld are, according to this view, to be 
treated not only as juridical, but as moral, equals. 
Policies which relate to this hemisphere are to be 
forged in common, and not imposed by the United 
States Qn the other members of the American com-
munity.j 
Our adherence to the Rio Agreement, the policy of 
non-intervention or intervention only as a cooperative effort 
that is approved by the Pan American community, has brought 
to the United States a sizable amount of good-will. Latin 
Americans under this policy are treated as equals. The 
onroe Doctrine was despised because it was unilateral. 
lWhitaker, QQ. cit., p. 158. 
2Dexter Perkins, The Evolution Qf American Policx 
(New York : Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 161-162. 
3 Ibid • , p. 171. 
-
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The modern method is multi-lateral and any deviation from 
this policy will cause offense and misunderstanding . 
In the spring and early summer of 1954, a serious 
political crisis developed in Central America . The author 
was living in Honduras at the time and saw the gravity of 
the situation. Guatemala was under the control of Jacobo 
Arbenz, and the United States was of the opinion that his 
government was controlled by the Communist Party . This 
later was proved to be correct . l At the time, however, 
the matter was a subject of serious debate in Central 
America . Many felt that the Arbenz Government was merely 
a development of nationalistic tendencies that had had 
courage enough to oppose the desires of the United Fruit 
Company and the United States Government . Honduras in 
general championed the cause of Jacobo Arbenz. This 
sympathy was reflected in the newspaper ~ Chil1Q in the 
issue of June 26, 1954, when it categorically declared, 
"Not one Honduran worker will fight against Guatemala . 11 2 
~hen the Guatemalan Government received a shipload 
of arms from a communist nation in Europe, the United States 
sent to Nicaragua and Honduras a shipment of arms in order 
lThe writer saw an abundance of documented proof to 
this effect a few months later in Guatemala City •. 
2Editorial in~ Chilio (Tegucigalpa, Honduras), 
June 26, 1954 . 
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to try to maintain a balance of military power in Central 
America. At the very same time a few American soldiers 
were sent to Honduras to help train the Honduran army in 
preparation for a possible invasion from Guatemala. As 
far as the author could find out there were perhaps 
twenty-five men in the group and certainly no more than 
fifty. 
Despite the fact that the action had the approval 
of President Galvez, the arrival of this small group of 
men and the arms shipments caused quite a sensation in all 
Honduras . Soon the rumor had covered the country that two 
thousand American marines had landed at Amapala, a port on 
the Pacific. Intervention was immediately suspected, so 
tempers flared. 
In blazing headlines ~ Chilio carried its comments 
in the issue of May 29, 1954. Here is the translation of 
the pertinent part: 
Today in our beloved nation, as in 1929, Yankee 
piracy has once again appeared in the land. With 
the insulting lie of 'defending the democratic 
institutions,' the neo-conquerors, the sons of 
Uncle Sam, have come mounted on powerful steel birds 
to disgrace national sovereignity. 
Already the colonizing boot of the Military Pact 
has tread upon the heart of Honduras . As they have 
done in the past, they have delivered us into the 
foreign claws of a Judas. Nevertheless the indomit-
able spirit of the youth of the land is inspired by 
the homeric action of that great Nicaraguan patriot, 
who is made of diamonds--Sandino. Sandino knew how 
to fight against the imperialists. With hardly a 
knife as a weapon , he fought for six years and 
caused historic defeats . Sandino lives in our 
hearts today . 
We must reject the military pact as consci-
entous Hondurans . It is leading us into being 
colonies . We are going into the past . l 
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The above editorial is accompanied by two cartoons . 
The first one depicts the Nicaraguan outlaw, Sandino, who 
successfully evaded capture by American troops in Nicaragua 
for six years . He is the one that made the boast of having 
defeated the Americans in battle . The second cartoon shows 
a Honduran, with his fist doubled up, standing face to 
face with Uncle Sam. 
After the overthrow of the Arbenz regime by Colonel 
Carlos Castillio Armas, who invaded Guatemala from Honduras, 
and who was believed by many to have received aid from the 
United States, a drastic change in attitude was notea . 
Arbenz was proved to have been a Communist, and not just 
a patriotic Guatemalan. Significantly, the United States 
had not occupied either nation. The Communists had been 
removed by Central Americans. Victory had been achieved, 
without the active participation of United States soldiers. 
Thirty years earlier the United States had used 
armed intervention in Central American situations that were 
almost local in nature . The Guatemalan problem was not a 
libig. , May 29, 1954 . 
-
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local matter, for Communism is an international problem. 
Nevertheless the United States permitted the matter to be 
settled under native sponsorship . There was no doubt as 
to which side was favored by the American State Department, 
yet we adhered to the non-intervention principle of the 
Good Neighbor Policy. For the Central Americans the 
Guatemalan Revolution is a favorable change that has come 
to United States' foreign policy in Latin America . 
When the Americans did not intervene, many newspapers 
and politicians were rather embarrased at their false and 
unflattering accusations of the Yankees . Their predictions 
had not come true, but yet they were essentially happy that 
their fears had been ungrounded. The newspaper editors of 
Honduras have been so embarrassed concerning their rash 
statements that it proved i mpossible to secure back issues 
of the papers that were published during those critical 
and tense days. 
On the basis of personal interviews and other con-
tacts with the citizens of Honduras, the author discovered 
that almost without exception the people had been opposed 
to the military intervention of the United States prior to 
1933 . However, there has been only praise for the conduct 
of the American Government during the Guatemalan Revolution. 
Some persons thought that the United States had given equip-
ment and arms to support Castillo Armas, but nevertheless 
ps 
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they were of the opinion that the United States had behaved 
as a good neighbor and had acted correctly in not directly 
intervening. To their way of thinking, it is no violation 
of their dignity for Central Americans to fight each other, 
even though one side may fight with arms provided by the 
United States. It would have been an entirely different 
situation had the United States landed American marines to 
overthrow the Arbenz Government. With the landing of the 
first Yankee soldier, there would have been cries of i mperi-
alism heard from numerous sectors of Latin America. The 
practice of the United States of not using armed force in 
Central America has proved to be a popular policy with the 
people of that area. 
IV. vmAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED FRUIT 
COMPANY IN CENTRAL Al'..'!ERICA? 
Any objective view of the situation must concede that 
the United Fruit Company has brought many benefits to Middle 
America. The frequent accusation that American investment 
in Central America has brought profit and advantage only to 
the American investors is simply untrue. The United Fruit 
Company has brought to Central America a better than average 
wage for the worker, great progress in its health and medical 
programs, and has developed modern means of transportation 
and communication. The advancement of agriculture and the 
.... 
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diversification of crops has been introduced . Industry has 
been created which perhaps could not have developed inde-
pendent of foreign capital, and the nations in which the 
Company operates receive a major source of income from the 
operations of the American corporation. 
Yet without trying to minimize the favorable contri-
butions of the United Fruit Company, a realistic appraisal 
of the facts must also recognize the problems that have been 
created as a result of the Company's development in Central 
America. Anyone who has had an extended visit in Central 
America soon discovers that the fruit company is not held in 
high esteem despite its many benevolent characteristics. 
This dislike is the result of many circumstances . 
The countries of Central America are small--very 
small, and the United Fruit Company is large--very large. 
The fruit company therefore is feared because of its great 
size . The wealth of the United Fruit Company is greater 
than the capital of any one of the Central American nations 
in which it operates . l In the nations where it is eatablish-
ed, the Company controls the major portion of the railroads, 
the steamship lines, and the means of communication. United 
Fruit has the largest payroll in Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Costa Rica . These three nations receive from the Company a 
-------
lperkins, Q]. cit., pp . 183-186. 
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major portion of their income in the form of taxes , assess-
ments , and other financial remuneration. The size of the 
Company and the scope of its operations give it a powerful 
voice in the economy of each country . These small nations 
very well know that the economic life of their land is in 
the hands of United Fruit . For that reason they have been 
called the "Banana Republics . 11 
John Gunther has said of Honduras: 
Honduras is the banana republic par excellence, 
and it is a little more or less than a preserve of 
the United Fruit Company . About 30 percent of the 
company's banana lands--valued at $45,ooo,ooo--are 
in Honduras . The company controls ports, harbors, 
newspapers, plantations . There are no taxes in 
Honduras; revenue comes from customs and United 
Fruit . The government budget (only about $6,ooo, 
000) is usually out of balance, and the company 
helps to make up the deficit. Recently it advanced 
$300,000 to meet government pay rolls . Honduras is 
perpetually in debt . l 
w· ell publicized statements such as Gunther's are a 
source of embarrassment to these small countries . They want 
to be able to picture themselves as sovereign, independent 
nations . Even though it may be true, it is extremely humil-
iating for the Central Americas to be known as "Banana 
Republics't or "a preserve of the United Fruit Company." As 
a consequence there is a natural dislike for the organiza-
tion that is responsible for their economic dependence, and 
1John Gunther, Inside 1atin America (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1941), p . 144. 
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also a growing dasire to throw off the power of the fruit 
company to show the world that they can stand on their own 
feet. National pride rejects economic dependence on a 
foreign firm. 
Experience has also taught the Central Americans 
that the United Fruit Company knows how to use its great 
power and size to secure the desired aims, even at the 
expense of the nation involved. The United Fruit Company 
has perfected an economic tactic to use against countries 
that are not ready to comply with the demands of the firm. 
For example, when the Company and Guatemala could not come 
to terms, the United Fruit Company chose to curtail its 
ship traffic to and from Guatemala.l Guatemala soon felt 
the lack of American dollars, and United Fruit was thus 
able to apply effective economic pressure • Situations 
such as this only magnify economic dependence upon the 
United Fruit Company and create greater feeling of resent-
ment. In describing the economic dependence of Honduras 
upon United Fruit, Latin Americans have been known to 
gra phically declare, "The economy of Honduras is standing 
upon a banana peel." 
The United Fruit Company is t he syrnbol of Yankee 
l"Bananas and Politics, 11 The New Republic, CXXVI 
(January 28, 1952), 7. 
p 
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imperialism in Central America.l This is true because of 
some rather unfortunate circumstances. One concrete example 
has been given. 
The United Fruit Company which prefers to do 
business with the weak re publics of Central America--
its dealings with the British Islands and the Ameri-
can possessions are negligible--suddenly found itself 
confronted by a man (Juan Jose Arevalo in Guatemala) 
who said 'If I am elected president, I shall see that 
our workers are treated with the consideration shown 
to foreigners.' United Fruit translated these words 
into 'Arevalo is a Communist.' United States Ambassa-
dor, Richard G. Patterson, Jr., was a man not over-
endowed with tact, and as between Guatemala and the 
United Fruit Company, he was unequivocally with the 
latter. 'Unofficially, Mr . President,' he said to fur. 
Arevalo one day, 'I want you to know that as far as I 
personally am concerned your Government will never 
get a dime from my Government unless you cease the 
persecution of American business.' In turn, Arevalo 
said to Samuel Guy Inman, who reported it in 'A New 
Day in Guatemala' (1951): ' You do not have an 
ambassador of the United States here, but a representa-
tive of the United Fruit.•2 
As noted in the above illustration, it is a very 
common belief that the United Fruit Company is directly 
supported by the United States Government. It has been 
very easy for the Central Americans to accuse the United 
States Government of political imperialism~ , charge the 
United Fruit Company with economic imperialism, and then 
.J reach the conclusion that the two groups have worked 
----------------
York: 
lGerman Arciniegas, ~ State of b~tin Americ~ (New 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 285:-
2Ibig., p. 295. 
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in close cooperation to bring about the domination of the 
Middle American nations. Inasmuch as the courts in the United 
States have not forced the United Fruit Conpany to break up 
its so-called monopoly in Central America, while at the same 
time corporations working within the United States have been 
broken down into smaller groups upon conviction of being 
monopolies, the Central Americans have been quick to assume 
that the United Fruit Conpany is favored and supported by 
the United States Government. If the Justice Department of 
the United States is successful in its present attempt to 
reduce the size of the United Fruit, then the Central Americans 
will be less inclined to feel that the United States Govern-
ment sponsors the Company. -
The United Fruit Company has realized that the general 
public reaction to its presence in Central America has not 
been favorable, so it has conducted a public relations cam-
paign to try to present to the natives the positive results 
of the firm's presence. Full-page adds are purchased in 
magazines such as Selecciones (Reader's Digest in Spanish), 
Life ~n Espanol (Life in Spanish), and in newspapers. These 
paid advertisements usually depict a native engaged in some 
type of useful occupation such as a locomotive engineer, a 
radio operator, a surveyor, a nurse, a school teacher, or 
in some other attractive position. The Company is very clear 
in pointing out that these individuals are in such favored 
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occupations because they have been employed by the United 
Fruit Company. Native reaction to these adds is too often 
entirely negative. The natives dislike being reminded con-
stantly of the fact that the United Fruit Company, a foreign 
firm, had done for them many things that they should have 
done for themselves. This injures their pride. The people 
fully realize that their countries are backward and lack 
modern methods, but dislike the Company when it tries to 
show what the Company has done to improve their life. 
Paternalism is again despised in this res pect . In no way 
do they want to have someone saying repeatedly, "Look what 
we have done for you. You would have been in a much worse 
condition had we not come to help you." 
The author conducted a personal interview with a man 
who had been employed by the United Fruit Company for fifteen 
years in Guatemala. He is a Honduran by birth, having had 
an American father and a Honduran mother. This man was 
educated in the United States, was graduated from Columbia 
University, and was wounded in action as he served with the 
American army during the First World War . He was very eager 
to express his love for the United States, but was just as 
eager to denounce the United Fruit Company. Personally he 
felt that he had no reason to complain as a result of his 
own affiliation with the Company, for he felt that he had 
been treated in a fair and a just manner, but he was very 
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vehement in denouncing United Fruit in its relationship with 
the average Central American. It may be that he was favored 
due to the fact of having an American name and being able to 
speak English correctly. 
Frank ililliamsl listed the major complaints that the 
average Central American has in respect to the fruit company. 
Similar complaints are listed in detail and declared to be 
absolutely valid in at least two books published by Hondurans. 
The two volumes iseris ~ Despojo gn Centroamerica2 and 
Prision Verd~3 are believed to be slightly exaggerated, but 
nevertheless they do reflect the major complaints that are 
very prevelant in Central America, and especially in Honduras. 
Conditions such as described by Mr. Williams are also in 
part cited in Kepner and Soothill's book, ~ B§nana Empire.4 
I~. Williams declared that the basic reason for a 
dislike of United Fruit Company is due to the way in which 
the firm secured its present land holdings. Frequently 
when the Company desired to purchase a certain section of 
land ~ it encountered local land owners who did not wish to 
lThis is a fictitious name. 
2Jose Gorge Callejas, Miseria ~ Despojo Qll Centro-
~erica (1exico City: Editorial Jus, 1954). 
3Ramon Amaya Amador, Prision Ver.Q&, (Mexico City: 
Editorial Latina, 1950). 
4charles David Ke pner, and Jay Henry Soothill, T»e 
Ba~ Empi~ (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1935). 
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sell , the Company then offered to purchase the bananas that 
the man would produce, inasmuch as it was banana land . 
Several months later the Company would state that on a cer-
tain date they would purchase from the man a thousand stems 
of bananas . Of course the native was eager to reap his 
profit, so on the established date he would have the fruit 
awaiting Company transportation. However, much to the 
farmer's dismay, he learned that 90% of his bananas were 
rejected as inferior. The Company would pay him for one-
hundred stems and the farmer would be left with nine hundred 
stems on his hands and no one to buy them, for the fruit 
company was t he only purchaser of bananas in such large 
quantities . Many men had been employed by the farmer in the 
production of his crop and they had to be paid . The farmer 
had lost his investrr.ent and often became literally bankrupt . 
Immediately thereafter a fruit company representative would 
call upon the man and offer to buy his land, and emphasize 
the fact that it was evident that he couldn't make a living 
by raising bananas on his own as he didn't know how. Usually, 
due to his financial losses, the man would yield and sell 
his land . 
Mr . Williams was very prompt in stating that in recent 
years conditions such as described above no longer exist, yet 
the resentment and distrust still remain among the natives. 
Mr. "filliams elaborated further: 
It is true, that the U~ited Fruit Company has 
brought many new jobs and positions to our nations, 
but a national can advance so far and no farther . 
It is true that the Company pays the Hondurans more 
than any other firm, but we don•t like the racial 
discrimination that is shown. For example, I know 
young Honduran engineer that has been working for 
the Company twelve years . Recently a young North 
American arrived from the United States and he was 
placed with the Honduran to work . The American 
knew little Spanish and apparently had never seen 
a banana plant before . The Honduran taught the 
American what he knew about the operation of the 
work . That was several months ago . Now the 
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American is the superviser over the Honduran and 
receives twice the wages . 1e Hondurans can• t under-
stand why the Americans are constantly advanced over 
us . Even in the hos pitals it is the same. re appre-
ciate the medical work, but we can•t understand why 
the Americans receive private rooms and special 
treatment when t he Hondurans are treated in wards. 
In res ponse to the question 11Do you think Central 
America is better-off because of the operations of United 
Fruit in your ares?" he replied: 
Let me answer your question by asking you one. 
Do you t hink the North American Indians are better-
off because of t he arr ival of the Europeans? Yes, 
the Indian on the reservation may have food, a car, 
even a television set, but is he happy? I think 
we all realize that he may have been happier had 
he been left alone . That is the way we feel . The 
Company has brought us a measure of civilization, 
but we are not happy. 
The comparison made by :r.rr . Williams is hardly valid, 
but it does reflect the idea that some Central Americans 
feel that they wrn1ld have been happier had the United Fruit 
Company not come to their area . 
"Do you feel that Honduras has been advanced econorn..i-
cally by the United Fruit Company?" 
Not necessarily. Just look at Salvador , our 
next door neighbor . The United Fruit Company does 
not operate there, and yet it is one of the most 
advanced countries of Latin America . I think we 
would have been more advanced had we been left 
alone . 
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"How has the United Fruit Company affected the 
Central Americans in their attitude toward North Americans?" 
~e have respect for the United States as a na-
tion. Personally I love it . It was my father's 
nation and I fought for it in 1918 . Nevertheless, 
the average Honduran has no use for the North 
American. This would be the opinion of most all 
Central Americans . Take my daughter for example . 
I tried to teach her English, but she despised 
even the sound of it . She hated the Americans . 
I tried to show her that she was one-quarter 
American, and should know more about American life, 
but she rebelled . Her hatred was displayed even 
in the presence of my American friends . I took 
her to the United States and she received her high 
school and college training . Now she loves the 
American people . 'Then she got away from Central 
America and the employees of United Fruit, her ideas 
changed . e don't like the Americans in Central 
America because they look down on us and refuse to 
treat us as equals . 
In the late spring of 1954, a strike was declared 
against the United Fruit Co~pany and its subsidiaries in 
Honduras . The strike lasted for many weeks . The people 
suffered financially and the Company lost millions of 
dollars . The workers received only a very small percentage 
of that which they asked, and it may be that that is all 
that was anticipated . However, the significant point is 
found in the way the people of the nation backed the strik-
ers . Funds were solicited and received from all sections 
of the nation to aid them in their struggle. Public 
151 
sentiment urged a settlement in the striker ' s favor . 
ll Chilio in the edition of Uay 29 , 1954, (the same 
edition that boldly condemned the prospect of American 
intervention in Honduras) was filled with congratul atory 
letters and comments for the men on strike . A sample has 
been selected . 
I am completely filled with patriotic joy, a 
joy that I have never before experienced ••• 
You are writing one of the most transcendental 
and historic pages of contemporary Central Ameri-
can history . · 
The same news ,)aper again stated on June 12, 
Te remember with evil memories the establish-
ment of the United Fruit Company ••• They have 
become the political winds . They came to exploit 
in a tremendou~ way our national resources and to 
exploit the Honduran laborers . They now possess 
the best lands of our own North Coast ••• 
Honduras has started her fight for liberty . 
Other Honduran newspapers, notablf El Pueblo , ~ 
Cronista and 1s Epoga expressed similar approval and encour-
agement for those that were fighting against 1s Companjs 
and 1a United . 
V. \'ffiAT IS THE OPINION OF THE NATIVE CEJTRAL AMERICAN 
CONCERNING THE YANKEE? 
While the author was in the midst of the writing of 
this thesis, he had the opportunity to make again a visit 
to Central America-- to the Republic of Honduras. 'fhile 
there he had the opportunity of conducting interviews with 
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fifteen different individuals on the question of the Central 
American ' s att itude toward the Yankee . In the United States 
he has had similar interviews with three other residents of 
Central America . 
The problem was discussed with both North Americans 
and natives . It was desired to learn how the Americans them-
selves had been treated and what their opinions were con-
cerning the native reaction to their residence in Central 
America . Then he secured first hand a few opinions directly 
from the Hondurans . 
Ten American citizens residing in Honduras were ques -
tioned . In occupation they varied from a grade-school 
teacher that is married to a Honduran, to one of the highest 
officials in t he United States Embassy . All but the Embassy 
official have had a very direct contact with the natives, 
that is, they have not lived in an American colony but have 
lived in their own homes among the Hondurans . The average 
length of time spent in Central America by those questioned 
was twelve . years . All of them did not feel that they could 
offer an opinion on eac h question asked . 
"Then questioned as to whether they thought the opinion 
toward the Yankee had improved or declined during their 
residence in Central America, six definitely st ted that it 
had declined . Two felt that it had improved . One of the 
latter came to Honduras in 1934, which was just after the 
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periods of intervention, so she felt the Americans are now 
more highlY res pected than at the time of her arrival . The 
other one that gave a positive answer was an official of 
the American Embassy. He vms sold on present policies and 
felt that they were achieving desirable results . 
It is interesting to note that the natives of Central 
America have felt that American relations with their cOUl1-
tries have i mproved in recent years, whereas the majority of 
the American citizens of the same area felt that the native 
opinion of the Yankee has declined . It may be that the 
native respects the policies and principles of the United 
States, but have a growing tendency to want Americans to 
stay home and have Honduras for the Hondurans . 
1
,• hen asked to suggest reasons why the Yankee was dis-
liked, five of the Americans stated that in the eyes of the 
native the American had a too superior attitude, three felt 
that the native thought that Americans were ex loiting the 
people, and one categorically placed the blame on the United 
FTui t Company . 
Six of the eight giving an answer stated that they had 
never been discriminated against as a North American . One of 
these had lived in Central America twenty-eight years without 
having any negative reaction to her nationality . The two 
that had felt some type of discrimination could give only 
one illustration each, and both events transpired during a 
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time when the United Fruit Company v1as having labor diffi-
culties . (None of those questioned were employed by United 
Fruit . ) All questioned were of the opinion that they have 
usually been respected as a result of being an American. 
Each of the Americans was asked to state an opinion 
as to whether he felt the United States·- sponsored plan of 
mutual assistance to Central America (commonly known as 
Point Four) was proving successful . Eight felt the plan 
was the best way to assist the Central Americans and also 
felt that it was a very acceptable way of improving rela-
tions . One believed that Point Four was looked upon by the 
natives as another way in which the Americans could display 
their superiority. Another was of the opinion that "the 
more we help them, the more they will dislike us . " All of 
those questioned felt that Point Four was helping the 
countries agriculturally, educationally, and socially, and 
believed that almost all of the natives were appreciative 
of the assistance . 
It appears that the Central Americans appreciate the 
mutual assistance of the United States Government, but dis -
like American charity . Nearly every American praised Point 
Four but were unanimous in expressing their disfavor of the 
American organization known as C A R E. Tens of thousands 
of C A R E food packages were distributed in Honduras in 
recent months, but it was generally felt that little good-will 
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was created . The prominent reason for the criticism was 
due to the lack of organization in the actual distribution 
of the free packages. It was reported that very frequently 
those who'~ had no need received the food whereas the people 
in need were omitted . Near riots resulted and hard feel -
ing was created . 
As the natives were interviewed , a wider difference 
of opinion was found than among the American residents . The 
nationals were asked a few questions that the Americans were 
not re uested to answer . The individuals questioned repre-
sented various occupations and social categories . Included 
in the group were a shoemaker, a senator, a recent univer-
sity graduate , a farmer, a miner, a minister, an educational 
supervisor, and a former employee of the United Fruit Com-
pany. Only one man, the shoemaker, believed that the United 
States had had the right to intervene in Central America 
during the period before 1933 . However, about one-half of 
them felt that the end result was beneficial for the nation. 
All of them but the recent university graduate were of the 
opinion that the United States could intervene in Central 
American politics of an international nature if approval 
were given by the other Central American countries . However, 
all but the shoemaker strongly urged that the United States 
stay out of internal politics and let the nationals of the 
country concerned handle the local problems. All felt that 
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the Point Four Program was a very acceptable way for the 
United States to assist Central America, but those who had 
had a direct contact with C A R E felt it a poor means of 
improving relations between the two areas. Again the chief 
criticism of C A R E was the lack of organization to bring 
about a systematic means of distribution. The recent uni-
versity graduate was the only one to categorically state 
that the native opinion of the American was worse today 
than it was twenty-five years ago. 
In response to the question , "Wha t is the opinion of 
the average Central American concerning the Yankee?" the 
following answers were given: 
The Shoemaker: We wa nt more American assistance. 
The United States never does anything bad. They a£r~e------------­
needed to help us to secure our liberty. Under the 
present government we have no liberty. The United 
States can help us. 
The fo~~ United Fruit Company employee: The 
average Honduran has no use for the American. They 
are hated . However , it is better than it used to be. 
The recent university ~actuate: Among the stu-
dents of the University of Honduras, the United 
States is looked upon with disfavor. They resent 
any action of the American Government in Central 
America. The Yankee is despised- This is true in 
the capital and in the sections where the fruit com-
Panie s operate. In the small towns and among the 
poorer people, the American is highly res pected and 
admired. They make us feel inferior and we dislike 
it. 
The ~tor: The average Honduran loves the 
American . It is only when he is stirred up by some 
minority group that he may appear otherwise and this 
attitude soon passes. 
The ed~cational suQerviser: In the big towns 
they hate him, but elsewhere he is l ooked up to . 
Most everyone is against the United Fruit Company . 
Americans are too superior . They look down on us . 
The miner: The man who has worked for the 
Rosario r,:ining Company feels that Americans are 
out to exploit the country. They don ' t treat us as 
humans . They make promises to get us to work and 
then don ' t keep them. The law doesn't punish them. 
They can get by with anything . 
The farmer: :any see the American as an exploit-
er . He is seen as one who is in our nation only to 
secure money . 
The Pr otestant ministgr: The moral behavior of 
the American citizen in Central America has handi-
capped his influence. Fowever, almost all North 
Americans are greatly respected . They are admired . 
Here in the capital, especially among the students, 
and among t hose wit h t he United, I have noted an 
anti-American s pirit, but on the whole we like the 
Americans. 
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In making a comparison of the response secured f'rorn 
both the Americans and t he nationals a few basic conclu-
sions have been drawn. The intervention of the United States 
in the internal political affairs of t he Central American 
republics is condemned as past action and is definitely not 
wanted in the future . r orth Americans are disliked for two 
major reasons: they apparently display a spirit of super-
iority and are considered to be exploiters. The Point Four 
Program is considered an acceptable way for the United States 
to assist Central America, but the C A R E program is looked 
upon with disfavor largely because of the lack of organiza-
tion in the distribution of the food pacl"..ages, and because 
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of the unsuitable character of the food they contain. 
From the interviews it appears that there is an anti-
American feeling in Central America, but it seems to be 
centered in the larse cities, especially among the univer-
sity students, and among those that have had direct contact 
with American firms such as the United Fruit Company . Those 
that are not living under the above influence apparently 
have a high respect for the North Americans . Under usual 
circumstances the Yankee is shown great courtesy . When he 
is discriminated against, it is usually because of a tense 
situation that has arisen between the United Fruit Company 
and its workers, or when a threat of American intervention 
is feared . 
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISI1I IN CENTRAL A1'lERICA 
Careful observers of current history are very much 
aware of the fact that nationalism is a growing force in the 
world today . Central America is no exce otion to the trend • 
As has so often been true in the history of modern nations , 
the spirit of nationalism is much more pronounced among the 
Wliversity students and youth organizations . The Central 
Americans are painfully acquainted with the realization that 
their nations are backward, and inasmuch as their politics 
and economies have often been con trolled by foreign elements, 
there exists the tendency to place the blame for their 
backwardness upon the foreigners and inwa1t them expelled 
from the country . 
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Due to the fact that the largest foreign element 1n 
Central America is represented by United States citizens, 
the spirit of nationalism has largely been focused upon 
the ~ingo . However, the author discovered that even 
though nearly all Americans living in that sector are of 
the belief that nationalism is definitely growing stronger, 
still the Americans feel that this nationalistic tendency 
is not so much a result of foreign interference as it is a 
natur81 development . 
Nationalism has created a growing desire to take over 
the operation of foreign firms that are operating in Central 
America . A very striking example of this tendency was to 
be found in Costa Rica in 1954. Before the United Fruit 
Company was able to negotiate a new agreement that was 
acceptable to Costa Rica, President Jose Figueres presented 
a bold plan that readily reflected the tendency toward the 
local control of business enterprize. Figueres advocated 
the sale of the United Fruit Company lands to Costa Ricans, 
but desired that the distribution of the harvested bananas 
be left in the hands of the American corporation. !ll~ re-
ported the Figueres' idea as follows: 
President Figueres chose to outline his plan 
in a 2,000 word letter to United States' Ambassador 
Robert c. Hill . Terms of the existing contract, he 
said, are fair and just only in the spirit of 50 
years ago, when banana cultivation was a little-
known and risky venture. How Costa Ricans are cap-
able of nroducing commercial crops, and he proposed 
to buy out the company plantations--housing, school, 
hospitals, machinery, servicing equipment and all. 
His government would resell the plantation proper-
ties to Costa Ricans, but would keep and run the 
schools and hospitals. 
Details of the transaction, including the price 
of the properties and terms of payment would be 
worked out in a friendly s pirit with United Fruit, 
he emphasized, es ;:Jecially since the sale would have 
to be amortized over a long period of credit from 
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the company. Figueres reported that he had already 
outlined his plan to United Fruit 's board chairman, 
Thomas Jefferson Coolidge, when Coolidge visited San 
Jose last month . 'I explicitly told Coolidge,' the 
President said, 'that it is not the intention of my 
government to nationalize the industry by exproporia-
tion or any violent measure • • • The sale plan is 
a sinple suggestion to sow the idea in the minds of 
the directors ••• •1 
?resident Figures settled for much less than his 
suggested plan, for his government received only the schools 
and the hospitals. United Fruit now pays a thirty percent 
corporation tax, but all the property is still owned and 
operated by the Company. Nevertheless, in all Central 
American nations there lies the hope that they soon will be 
able to have as their very own the foreign firms. It is 
doubtful if the nationals would be able to manage these 
lttcoata Rica Buy United Fruit?tt Time, LXIII (January 4, 
1954)' 26. 
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industries as well as they are now operated, but it is 
believed that the people would be much more content under 
a native sponsorship, and the financial profits secured 
would in a much larger measure be retained within the 
countries . 
The growing spirit of nationalism at times has been 
much more violent than that described above . During the 
strike against the United Fruit Company in Honduras in 1954, 
the sentiment against this foreign corporation was so strong 
that mobs of natives paraded the streets of San Pedro Sula, 
which is the center of Company activity, and virtually 
declared their hate for the Company . "Death to the Company 
and the Gringo" was a frequent cry. The American Embassy 
alerted the American citizens to be ready for evacuation. 
Armed soldiers were required to control similar demonstra-
tions among the university students of Tegulcigalpa . 
The writer believes that the Central Americans admire 
the Yankee as a man, but their nationalistic tendencies have 
caused them to resent any foreign power that prevents them 
from doing as they desire in their own land . Inasmuch as 
the United Fruit Company is the major commercial power in 
Central America, this organization is the chief target of 
criticism. It is American-operated and thus the Yankee 
shares the criticism. 
The growth of nationalism is a matter that should be 
carefully observed in the Central American area , for 
Communism frequently has used this channel to secure its. 
desired footholds . 
Anti -United States feeling--whether appearing 
as reasoned opposition to 'Yankee imperialism ' or 
unreasoned anti-yanquismo--is rampant . 
This was not created by Communist propaganda, 
and it is not the monopoly of the Communists; it 
stems from both real and fancied grievances , some 
of them historical and is manifested by Latin 
A~ricans of all political persuasions and walks 
of life . It is most pronounced among the educated 
classes • • • 
Communist policy is to fan the flames of nation-
alism even higher . l 
The people of Central America are opposed to Communism 
as such, but an exaggerated s pirit of nationalism canL create 
a fertile field in which Communism can develop . The Arbenz 
Government in Guatemala is a vivid illustration of this 
fact . Castillo Armas overthrew the Communist rulers, but 
the spirit of nationalism remains . 
lnaniel James, tt\Ffhere Communism Is Strong and Why?'t 
The New Republic, CXXXI (December 13, 1954) , 9- l2 . 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS Al;D RECOW.:ENDATIONS 
In general, the response in Central America to the 
foreign policy of the United States has been a negative one . 
That policy has been disliked because until recently it has 
been largely a unilateral proposition. Central American 
citizens, unde~tandably enough, have failed to appreciate 
the paternalism or benevolent motivation of their huge 
neighbor to the north . American intervention in the internal 
affairs of their small re publics has been an affront to their 
dignity--a matter not easily forgotten. Nevertheless, the 
advent of the Good Neighbor policy, with its accompanying 
adherence to the principle of non-intervention except by 
multilateral agreements, is commencing to show a marked 
improvement in foreign relations . 
As has been noted , American governmental intervention 
in Central America was imperialism, at any rate of a mild 
variety . In at least two significant respects, however, it 
was distinctly different from t he colonial imperialism then 
in vogue among European powers . For one t hing, American 
intervention was only temporary, and at no time envisaged 
permanent-- or even long-term--occupation of the country 
affected . Secondly, the intervention was not for the primary 
purpose of obtaining political or even military or economic 
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control, but chiefly to secure peace and stability, and to 
improve conditions for the populations of the areas involved. 
A considerable measure of order, security and progress (both 
political and economic) did result from American action. 
Such misunderstandings as occurred largely resulted from 
cultural differences and an inadequate comprehension of the 
motives involved. Essentially, the United States sincerely 
desired to be of help, but because its representatives were 
foreigners the assistance was suspected and not fully appreci-
ated. 
The United Fruit Company is the symbol of Yankee 
economic imperialism. It is viewed with s ome disf'avor by 
most of the nationals who have been associated with it. Its 
gigantic size and power make it an object of fear and mis-
trust. kany persons feel it is supported by the American 
government, and they resent the times it has meddled in 
---- ---
local politics. ~{hile the Company undeniably has brought 
civilizing elements into Central America, the evidences of 
racial discrimination it has provided have actually added 
to its unpopularity. kany of its positive accomplishments 
have thereby been undone, insofar as the effect upon the 
Central American mind is concerned. The United States 
Government would be much more highly respected in Central 
America if the Justice Department were to condemn United 
Fruit as a monopoly and curtail its size and power. 
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Admittedly, however, it is quite doubtful if a considerable 
number of smaller firms could be as successful in producing 
bananas for the export market . 
An anti-American feeling exists in Central America, 
but it is largely confined to the large cities, the univer-
sity groups, and those having contact with the United Fruit 
Company or its subsidiaries. This anti-ya.nauismo is fanned 
by the fires of nationalism. At times it results in 
emotional demonstrations. Ordinary rural dwellers living 
outside the Fruit Company areas tend to admire the United 
States and its people. This group is in the majority, but 
the growth of nationalism is evident almost everywhere. 
The United States can very greatly improve its posi-
tion in Central America if it strictly adheres to the 
principle of non-intervention in the national affairs of 
these small republics. If at any time intervention should 
appear necessary, it should only be attempted with the 
consent and cooperation of the other nations of the Pan-
American community. This method is acceptable according 
to the Rio agreement. However, American marines should not 
be used if it can be avoided, when and if intervention should 
ever become a necessity. It would be much more favorable for 
American prestige if, during these periods of emergency, 
Latin American soldiers were used but with North American 
support. 
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Since Point Four operates in cooperation with local 
\ 
governments, the United States can best help the nations of 
this region by continuing with this Mutual Assistance Pro-
gram . Unless caution is employed, however , to utilize as 
many nationals as possible in the dissemination of technical 
information and modern methods, a negative reaction may 
develop against what natives would call Yankee paternalism 
or a dis play of Yankee superiority . Point Four is widely 
accepted because it is a plan in which the United States 
shares with Central America . Both parties help pay for the 
program. It is not charity . Obvious charity, such as 
C A R E packages, is felt to be somewhat demeaning and is 
much less appreciated . 
Loans and grants should continue to be made to these 
nations so that roads, railroads and other means of communi-
cation may be developed. The lack of these essentials of 
modern society is tragic, and when it is remedied the 
general progress of the nations will be greatly advanced . 
The United States State Department should not send 
diplomats to Central America unless they have had an extended 
and intensive training in the field of Latin American psy-
chology and culture . One of the major sources of difficulty 
has been a lack of understanding . The Latin American cannot 
be quickly understood, and if a greater degree of mutual 
understanding is to be achieved, only those acauainted with 
Latin Americans should attempt to solve their problems . 
The author has been greatly shocked at the lack of compre-
hension so evident in the actions of some in high authority 
at his own American Embassy in Honduras . Few could speak 
Spanish and thus had no way of learning from the people 
directly . Many were novices at the job and it was easy 
to see why mistakes are made . 
Student exchange should be facilitated . The author 
has had a direct contact with many Central Americans study-
ing in the United States, and all have been favorably 
impressed with the American peo ple . Upon their return to 
Central America, they will assist in improving relations . 
The knowledge secured in the United States will prove a 
valuable asset to the advancement of their countries as well . 
Dana G. Iv1unro gives a valuable suggestion as to how 
the United States can help Central America by a measure of 
control over the American corporations that operate there . 
It is highly desirable that the United States 
should exercise a measure of control over the oper-
ations not only of American bankers but of other 
American corporations which do business in the 
Isthmus . The economic development of the last 
twenty- five years has created a situation in hich 
some of the five republics are almost powerless to 
protect themselves against the oppression and greed 
of foreign interests, for companies are able to 
bring to the support of their projects financial 
resources which far exceed those of the local gov-
ernment or of any group of natives . Some of these 
concerns, by the corruption of officials or by the 
unscrupulous use of their control of transportation 
facilities , have obtained special privileges which 
have been an obstacle to the legitimate business 
of other foreigners anG to the development of the 
cownunity as a whole . Moreover, serious inter-
national difficulties have not infrequently arisen 
when subsequent governments have attempted to 
annl' l or to modify these concessions . Only a more 
careful supervision of the contracts entered into 
by American concerns wit h native officials, who 
are not always above temptation and who are in any 
event rarely in a position to ascertain the finan-
cial resoonsibility of the concerns with which they 
are dealing or the ultimate effects of the privi-
leges vhich are asked, can insure the United States 
against the possibilit' of being forced to use its 
power to protect unscrupulous speculators and pre-
datory corporations in t he exercise of right which, 
even though legally acquired, are in many cases 
extremely unfair and injurious to the countries 
which have granted them . l 
In addition all business men should constantly 
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remember that they are in Central America as the guests of 
those nations and should act as such. At no time should 
they ask the small government to grant to them concessions 
that would not be granted to a native of that country . 
Existing evidence indicates that the United Fruit 
Company is currently attempting to improve its public rela-
tions with respect to Central America . Recent contracts 
have been much more favorable to the nations in which the 
Company operates . Its varied social endeavors are helping 
these nations, but the fact remains that the United Fruit 
Company is not a charitable organization- -it is in business 
to secure a profit for its stockholders . Existing relations 
lDana G. Munro, The Five Republics of Central 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 313. 
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may be improved by the complete elimination of racial dis-
crimination and by giving to nationals many more places o:f 
authority in the operation of the organization . At all 
odds, the Company should avoid any suggestion of paternal-
ism in the conduct of its social services . 
Basically, Central Americans are a peace-loving 
people . Even their scores of revolutions have resulted 
from the failure of existing governments to bring them the 
peace and stability they long for . Democracy is not a 
simple or an easy process at best . Previous to their inde-
pendence from Spain these peoples had had no experience in 
self-government; a high rate of illiteracy and the lack o~ 
an adequate educational system have made the instillation 
of democratic principles extremely difficult . Yet pro-
gress has been made, and is continuing . Political stability 
is coming much closer to reality. Mutual assistance from 
the United States is enabling these countries to build a 
firmer basis for their national economies , and the result 
is improving conditions throughout the entire society. 
Surely, with the improvements in education and living stand-
ards, we may hope that the population will become more 
settled and stable--and approach the goals of peace and 
prosperity that represent the legitimate aspirations of all 
mankind . 
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